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The Cresset

INLUCETUA
Turns of Phrase
Time for a quiz. Have you, in the last six months, prefaced
any utterance with the expression, "I guess this isn't politically correct, but... "? If you have not, you should probably
award yourself a prize, though you may have to go off by
yourself and enjoy it. I don't think your numbers are very
large.
As turns of phrase go, "politically correct" is probably
slightly more meaningful than "Where's the beef?" It has
persisted longer, though, and seems destined to occupy a
place in popular culture for some time, though it is hard to
predict the half life of pointless expressions. Let's seethere was "Well, excuuuuse me!" followed by-oh, never
mind. ·w hen so much of our culture is filled with phrases
and tags and sayings and slogans and bumper stickers ready
to slap on any number of occasions, we may perhaps be forgiven a tendency to jumble them up, or wish them all
transferred elsewhere.
A dislike for the adjectival and generally sneering prefix "politically correct" however, has more complex roots
than mere distaste for the vulgar. Whoever wants to lay
claim to having originated it, we do not have to look far to
see why it came into existence, and why it is so popular an
expression these days. It has come to function as a kind of
license, in fact, for sounding like the kind of person your
mother tried hard to discourage you from being: a rude,
selfish, opinionated, insensitive, unkind, thoughtless boor.
Oh, didn't your mother try to keep you from being
that, or at least from sounding like that? My mother-and
most other people's mothers in the days I'm remembering-constantly said things like, "Talk nicely to your
cousins," "Don't point and stare at people who look odd to
you," "If you can't say something nice , don't say anything at
all," or "How do you think she feels, with people saying
mean things to her? Go say something nice." Yes, I know,
we all grew up with too much emphasis on "nice," as
though it were the only virtue that mattered. Living now
with the almost complete public absence of "nice," I miss
it.
For awhile, it seemed that the virtues of kindness and
consideration, offered generally and not just to one's
friends and family, were becoming more widespread. For
awhile, it was considered bad form to tell jokes that
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depended on what my group thought was risible in your
group. For awhile, it looked like speaking publicly in terms
that denigrated another person's race or gender was
frowned upon. For awhile, people who had authority, people who were leaders, were more cautious about saying
stupid things about a wife's cooking, while introducing her
husband as a great American. For awhile, journalists
seemed to realize that mentioning the criminal's race only
if he were a black person might not be the right way to
behave. Publicly, we made a large effort to sound like the
thoughtful, caring, selfless people our mothers had in
mind.
But the effort was too much, evidently. We were subjected to strenuous insistence by some people that if a little
sensitivity to the feelings of others was good, then more
sensitivity would be better. And the demands produced an
inevitable backlash, all made possible by that little term,
"politically correct." Suddenly, it was all ok again-racial
jokes, stupid introductions, sexual innuendo. The term
made it possible to label and make fun of the effort to be
just ordinarily polite, or courteous, or civil. Now that effort
could be seen as "goody-goody," or cowardly, or-worst of
all American curses-coerced by governmental sanction.
The logic is dubious, but one finds it everywhere.
Something which is good on its own merits can be made to
look ridiculous, or even downright bad, just by saying, with
that knowing sneer: "Oh, I guess your group is doing that
because it's politically correct, huh?" (I add th e 'huh?'
because the tone has to be hectoring, belittling, and ironic,
so that if one objects, the speaker can say, "I was only joking. Can't you people take a joke?")
And some forms of speech, or some kinds of action,
which we all know to be wrong, or hurtful, or damaging, or
vicious, can be softened-or so we think-when prefaced
with, "Now I know this isn't politcally correct, but ... "
Saying the slogan allows us to give in to our worst selves,
and to put a kind of pleasantly astringent gloss on our hurtful, damaging or vicious statements. It allows us to feel that
we are boldly running against the grain, while we are probably just giving in once again to that oldest of all turners of
phrase, the one who prefaced his remarks by saying, "Did
God really say .. .?"
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Two long letters this month for Cresset readers, referring to Professor Paul Trout's article "Fahrenheit 451: The
Temperature at Which Critics Chill" about First Amendment
concerns in the November, 1993 Cresset. The critique is by
Richard Maxwell, of the VU Department of English .
Professor Maxwell is the author of a recent book about
Dickens, Hugo and the 19th century idea of the city, and
among his other interests, edited The Cresset during 1989.
Though his opening sally contains the remark that interest
in political correctness is passe, the vehemence of the argument would tend to contradict such a conclusion.

To the Editor:
Paul Trout's essay in the November 1993 Cresset purports to be a defense of the First Amendment. Speaking as
someone who is also a First Amendment absolutist or close
to it, I entreat readers to look elsewhere for an adequate presentation of the case for free speech. Eager to skewer "political correctness"-and latching on to this cliche about three
years late for anyone to care-Trout runs together so many
cases of fundamentally different kinds that he makes no
point at all. To cite two egregious moments . ..
(1) It is unclear why not inviting William Shockley to Yale
would be a form of censorship: do you have to ask every jackass in the stable to heehaw on your podium? Why is it censorship if you decline to honor people like Shockley who are
not only out of their depth but also out of their fields? Here
and elsewhere, Trout fails to distinguish between censorship
and making up a plausible speaker's list. By this standard,
any time a magazine turns down an incompetent article, the
author can cry censorship. (2) If, in his animadversions on
Jerome Kern, Mr. Trout is referring to the recent Toronto
production of Show Boat, it wasn't suppressed. I know this
because the Chicago Tribune recently gave it a prominentlyplaced review-which seems like overblown publicity rather
than censorship: Why is Show Boat in Toronto getting coverage in Illinois? Furthermore, while it is true that some people in Toronto didn't want Show Boat, and protested against
it, Mr. Trout rather confusingly rushes to judgment by asserting that this musical's "portrayal of blacks" is "sympathetic
and honest." Does he mean that if Show Boat hadn't been
"sympathetic and honest," censoring it would have been OK?
Finally, and most important to my mind, is he. aware of the
intricate te'xtual history of Show Boat, several of whose most
"sympathetic ·arid honest" moments were cut for decades
before being restored in a recent recording? Here as elsewhere, the question of who censors what and why is a great
deal more complex than Mr. Trout appears to realize.
Mr. Trout appears to be an eager collector of newspaper clippings. I will be glad to send him a few for his files
about an event he may well have missed, now known as the
4

Gulf War-perhaps the most extraordinary act of government censorship and thought-control since 1980. To put the
point another way, these "sensitive" or "radical" academics
who seem so deplorable from Trout's perspective may well
be right to suppose that governmental and institutional
information control is a greater danger to the polity and to
free speech than the combined rage of all the fat ladies in all
the art galleries of the land.
Mr. Trout supposes that Fahrenh eit 451 has been
neglected by academics because its message is so daring, so
uncongenial to sheltered liberals or radicals. Let me share
with Trout my own Ray Bradbury story, as a quick and convenient way of suggesting why this novel might not elicit universal respect from readers-liberal or not. In the late sixties
I was a student at the University of California, Riverside.
Bradbury came to speak. He remarked soulfully to the members of a rapt student audience that they should seek vocations which they enjoyed rather than those that paid well.
Mterwards, a student stood up and asked Bradbury if he
were being paid to give his lecture. Bradbury admitted that
he was; the student then suggested that Bradbury should lecture for the joy of it rather than for cash. Bradbury admitted
defeat: he announced, to some applause, that he would
donate his lecture fee to the student body treasury. A week
or two later, however, he wrote to the student administrator
of the speaker series, Larry Peitzman, asking for his money.
Peitzman refused to issue him a check. Bradbury then wrote
a second note , beginning with the words, "You snivelling lit- ·
tie fag, I know what you're up to and I'm going to let the
Chancellor know too." (Peitzman lisped slightly, a condition
exacerbated a year later when he fell off a mountain in the
Highlands of Scotland and knocked out most of his teeth.)
Bradbury, I'm glad to say, never got his money.
What conclusions would I draw from this sad and sordid tale? In Fahrenheit 451 and elsewhere, Bradbury loved to
pose as a richly caring liberal humanist, alive to the joys and
sorrows of this sublunary sphere, vibrating with the rhythms
of the universe, capable of the most transcendent flights of
imagination and the most earthy descents into a richly sensory delight. Unfortunately, he was really a mean little jerk.
This didn't always harm him as a writer; his best stories have
a sadomasochistic punch that puts him in a league with
Lovecraft and with Thomas Pynchon at his nastiest (I particularly love the story about the guy who has his skeleton
removed from his body, suddenly). But it hardly qualifies
him as the right person to drone on about the glories of
Shakespeare et al., or to posture as an adherent of courageously hard-hitting speech. Mr. Bradbury and Mr. Trout
might both want to remember that some insults are just
insults. They don't enrich the public sphere. They don't
make the rest of us tougher and more vigilant. They just add
a bit of stupidity to the world. If we put up with them, we
should do so reluctantly, not as a way of celebrating our own
supposed intellectual fearlessness. Were I to add a Bradbury
The Cressel

monograph to those few Mr. Trout found in the MLA
Bibliography, I would argue that the man who called Larry
Peitzman a sniveling little fag is also-in his literary voice, in
his inflated, ill-conceived pretentiousness, in his furtive and
petty desperations, so patent even from the few sentences
that Mr. Trout actually quotes-the man who wrote
Fahrenheit 451.

A final, not entirely incidental thought for Mr. Trout.
What's so trivial about writing on "masturbatory threats in
Low German ecclesiastical polemics of the 16th century"?
Seems like a logical, even urgent, issue for a culture concerned about celibacy. Mr. Trout is so lip-smackingly eager
to show that academics are pedants that here, and elsewhere, in his essay, he rather tends to trip over his own argument. Perhaps he hopes that-despite his enticingly macho
poses-we will forget that he too is a mere professor.
Sincerely,
Richard Maxwell

wrote, "the primary risk of censorship in our society today is
not from a government fearful of challenge, but from majorities seeking to establish an orthodoxy for all society."
Perhaps Mr. Maxwell, a First Amendment "almost absolutist," would understand the growing threat to free speech if
he listened more carefully to people like Barbara White,
Coordinator of the Women's Studies Program at the
University of New Hampshire, whose words make clear just
how contemptuously some now regard the very freedoms
that permit them to 'voice' their contempt for free speech in
the first place:
The AAUP, indeed, academia itself, has traditionally been dominated by white heterosexual men and the First Amendment and
Academic Freedom (I'll call them FAF) have traditionally protected
the rights of white heterosexual men. Most of us are silenced by
existing social conditions before we get the power to speak out in
any way where FAF might protect us. So forgive us if we don't get all
teary-eyed about FAF. Perhaps to you it's as sacrosanct as the Flag or
the national anthem; to us strict construction of the First
Amendment is just another yoke around our necks.

Professor Trout responds:

To the Editor:
My argument in "Fahrenheit 451: the Temperature at
Which Critics Chill" wasn't aboutJerome Kern or "fat
ladies." My argument was this: academics rarely write about
Fahrenheit 451 because they abhor the novel's depiction of
censorship not as governmental imposition but as the result
of all kinds of thin-skinned interest groups hell bent on
shutting up those who "offend" them. Just how abhorrent
Bradbury's message really is can be inferred from Richard
Maxwell's apoplectic response.
Of course we ought to be concerned about government
supression of speech, especially now that the government
itself seems to be enforcing speech-codes and sensitivity programs for thin-skinned interest groups. Recently Charles
Krauthammer in The New Republic revealed that an FBI agent
interrogating him about a candidate for an administrative
post wanted to know if the person ever showed he was prejudiced against a group based on race, ethnicity, gender,
national origin, etc. In other words, any sexist or racist jokes
told during those long years of friendship? Krauthammer
writes, "That is when it occurred to me that insensitive
speech had achieved official status as a thought crime" (see
also Jeremy]. Stone's "PC Invades the FBI," Wall Street
Journal, 2 November 93, A20).
But most such governmental intrusions are constrained by the First Amendment. The First Amendment,
however, does not constrain groups and individuals acting
on their own as private citizens. And that's where the First
Amendment is taking a real beating.
In a recent article on censorship, Kingsley R. Browne,
Associate Professor at Wayne State University Law School,
March 1994

An eccentric view? Hardly. The April 1993 issue of the
Canadian Association of University Teachers Bulletin contains
an article arguing that academic freedom is to be disallowed
if it conflicts with the establishment of a "woman-friendly university":
[A]rguments about academic freedom are being used by some people in the university against those who have been underrepresented
in the universities. This must not be allowed to occur. CAUT cannot
allow it. And individual faculty members, wearing all their hats,
whether as members of Senates or members of faculty associations,
cannot allow it to happen and must work to stop it.

At a conference in March, 1993, feminist legal scholars
gathered, as Jonathan Rauch writes, "to forge a strategy to
overcome the reluctance of federal courts to limit First
Amendment rights" (Wall Streetjoumal, 13 October 1993).
Fahrenheit 451, and other dystopias, warn all of us what
to expect when 'good people' come to believe that freedom's
just another word that's nothing much to lose.
Sincerely,
Paul A. Trout
Monatan State University
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SUICIDE IN TRAGEDY AND IN THEOLOGY
John D. Barbour

M ay the tragic and the Christian attitudes to suicide
be compatible or do they necessarily conflict? I will address
this question by comparing William Styron's Sophie's Choice
and James Gustafson's theological reflections on suicide.
First, however, let me briefly explain the reasons for seeing
tragedy and suicide as intimately connected. Our involvement with and response to the tragic protagonist, I submit,
resemble our response to the person who commits suicide.
In particular, the ethical and theological issues tragedy raises are similar to the questions provoked by suicide.
There is something tragic about every suicide.
However, not every literary representation of suicide is a
tragedy. Nor does every tragedy disclose the same attitude
toward the protagonist's death as the pattern I will trace in
Styron's novel. There are many kinds of literature ending
in different forms of violent death, and many different
forms of suicide represented within tragic literature. Yet
deep affinities link the literary genre of tragedy and the
human problem of suicide. It is remarkable, first, how
many tragic works end in suicide. This is particularly true
in both drama and the nove l since Shakespeare . From
Shakespeare's Antony and Cleopatra and Othello to such
modern tragic protagonists as Lord Jim, Hardy's Jude, and

John Barbour is a member of the Department of Religion at St.
Olaf College, where he teaches primarily in the field of Religion and
Literature, and has most recently published The Conscience of
the Autobiographer: Ethical and Religious Dimensions of
Autobiography with St. Martin's Press. This essay was first
given as an address at a conference on religion and theology in
Durham, England, and has been published this winter in a slightly different form in the Bri tish journal, Literature and
Theology.
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Styron's Sophie, many tragedies end in the clearest form of
suicide: a person's fully conscious and intentional choice to
terminate his or her own life. Still more numerous, however, are the cases in which a tragic protagonist, while
ambivalent about ending his or her life, engages in some
high ly dangerous conflict or endeavor that others would
call "suicidal" behavior. Take, for instance, Hamlet or Moby
Dick's Captain Aha b. Is the death of such a character a suicide?
Some scholars have argued for a narrow definition of
suicide as a fully conscious, d irectly willed, and freely chosen decision to end one's life by one's own hand. Such a
death can be distinguished from situations in which a person accepts death as a necessary price or sacrifice for
affirming some value or ideal more essential than continued life. This definition clearly distinguishes the suicide
from the martyr and from the reckless mountain-climber.
Others argue for a much broader definition of suicide that
would encompass any person's acceptance of and submission to their own death, including the person who does not
consciously desire to die but allows himself to do so in
given circumstances.
L et us accept the narrower definition of suicide as
the direct and deliberate taking of one's own life. Sophie's
choice to die is a suicide by this definition. Yet there are
many persons who commit suicide, and many tragic protagonists, whose complex motivation makes us doubt the value
of so clear and precise a definition of what counts as suicide. One analogy between tragedy and suicide is that both
often invo lve a person who is highly ambivalent about
dying. Many suicidal persons, like tragic characters, place
themselves in situations where they are virtually certain to
die. Yet they may warn others of their plans, or arrange to
be discovered before they are dead, or be relieved when
The Cresset

rescued from death. Many persons who attempt suicide
deny that their primary desire or intention is to die, insisting rather that they do not wish to live without something
essential to them, such as another person, a cause, or a
conception of their own dignity. Yet they may inadvertently
reveal a secret or unconscious desire for death, in forms
ranging from simple carelessness or recklessness to socially
commendable but extreme forms of altruism and self-sacrifice. The tragic protagonist's motivation and attitude
towards death are equally complex and ambivalent. To the
chorus or narrator in a tragedy, the protagonist's idealism
or visionary quest may mask an obsession with self-destruction.
The most crucial analogies between suicide and
tragedy are ethical and theological. If morality means
reflection on how human actions and character traits have
intrinsic value or disvalue, and how they affect the lives of
other people, then suicide is one of the most morally
weighty actions calling for assessment. Suicide causes longlasting grief, shame, guilt, and a very high expectation of
suicide among the survivors of the suicide. About such acts,
and about the variety of states of mind and circumstances
in which suicide occurs, we need to make crucial distinctions which shape not only our assessments of suicides, but
our basic orientation of dying and living.
My first reaction to many suicides is often moral disapproval or condemnation. To destroy one's life seems an
intrinsically wrong act, and the Christian tradition has long
held that suicide is a grave sin. Yet as I learn more about
the circumstances of a particular suicide, I usually begin to
feel that my initial moral judgment was too simple. For I
may learn of the desperation and pain of the suicidal person, and begin to enter into the mind of someone who
believes that death is the only way out of his or her suffering. I may come to see, too, how the act of dying may be an
attempt to affirm some essential value, and that the suicide
does not wish to live without this source of meaning. The
tragic protagonist is similarly ambiguous for moral assessment. A tragic character seems "one-sided" and extreme in
insisting that some principle or ideal is so important that
everything-including life itself-should be sacrificed for
it. I may judge such a person to be excessive, uncompromising, or arrogant in her violent assertion of will, and yet
admire her courage and commitment to what she most
loves. The tragic hero, like the suicide, makes a fatal decision under the press of ambiguous circumstances, the
influence of intense passion such as rage or grief, and an
apparent lack of alternative actions. About many suicides
and most tragic protagonists I feel a troubling uncertainty
and perplexity about how to assess them morally, yet at the
same time a deep need for ethical reflection and assessment.
MaTch 1994

Tragedy and suicide also raise similar theological
questions. Tragedy raises issues of theodicy when we sense
that the events that brought about the protagonist's
destruction are multiply determined. Tragic events are precipitated not only by the hero's agency, and not only by the
particular circumstances of his environment, but by the
very nature of human existence: by conflicts between equally important ideals, or by the limited foresight any mortal
can have, or by the power of the evils which finally corrupt
or destroy the hero. Tragic theology arises when the reasons for evil are traced to sources outside the human will,
and when these sources are interpreted in relation to the
ultimate powers which create and rule the universe.
Tragedy suggests that the gods or God are ultimately
responsible for evil. As Paul Ricoeur puts it, the hidden but
implicit religious vision of tragedy is "the scandalous theology of predestination to evil."
While all human suffering can raise theodical questions, a person's self-destruction poses issues of theodicy in
a vivid but ambiguous way that has much in common with
tragedy. Suicide shares tragedy's moral and theological
ambiguity when the responsibility for a person's selfdestruction can be traced to both human and divine
sources. An untimely death by suicide may make us angry
not only at the person who chooses to die, and at the society in which she lives, but at God. Such a death may make
us ask the classical questions about whether God lacks the
power or the goodness to have helped the individual find a
way to carry on. We may wonder whether the despairing
suicide could ever be reconciled with God, and how God's
grace can reach a person who performs what many
Christians have described as an unforgivable sin, the rejection of God's gift of life.
Thus there are several analogies between our interest
and involvement in tragedy and our uncertainty and perplexity about how to understand persons who commit suicide. In particular, the incentive for ethical and theological
reflection provided by tragedy is remarkably similar to the
questions provoked by suicide, focusing in each case on
ambiguous human and divine accountability for a violent
death.
II
The primary reason for Sophie's suicide is her overwhelming sense of guilt. In the terrifying scene at the climax of the novel, Sophie and her two children undergo
the "selection" between those persons to be immediately
murdered at Birkenau and those to be worked to death in
the slave labor camp at Auschwitz. Sophie is confronted by
the aptly-named S. S. doctor 'Jemand von Niemand" who,
when he discovers she is a Christian, gives her a choice: she
may save either her son or her daughter. Sophie chooses
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Jan, and Eva is dragged away screaming. Eventually Sophie
loses her son, too, in spite of her desperate attempts to persuade the commander of Auschwitz, Rudolf Hoess, to save
Jan. The horror of these events, and the depths of grief felt
by this young mother, cannot be described. To lose one's
children under any circumstances would be enough to
destroy many people. The demonic quality of Sophie's
experience is that the Nazis force her to feel implicated in
her children's deaths. Sophie feels that she has participated in their executions and that she is irredeemably guilty.
As a direct consequence of this traumatic experience,
Sophie first loses her faith in God, and finally her will to
live.
What makes Sophie's guilt tragic is its ethical ambiguity. In one sense Sophie's guilt is inappropriate, misplaced,
irrational. Surely it is the Nazis, not Sophie, who should be
condemned for killing her children. Even as we understand and feel compassion for Sophie, we must judge her
to make a great mistake in attributing so much moral guilt
to herself. Yet Sophie's feelings of guilt, while exaggerated,
are not entirely erroneous. Styron carefully distinguishes
his fictional character from the millions of Holocaust victims who had few if any choices at all. Sophie is not just a
victim, but an active protagonist in the novel's plot. Her
deliberate agency makes her a tragic heroine rather than
simply a pathetic sufferer caught up in the chaos of history.
"She had been a victim, yes, but both victim and accomplice, accessory-however haphazard and ambiguous and
uncalculating her design-to mass slaughter .... And
therein lay one (although not the only one) of the prime
causes of her devastating guilt" (266). Sophie makes not
only her central tragic decision on the railroad platform,
but numerous other crucial choices: to assist her father's
production of anti-Semitic pamphlets, not to help Wanda
and the Polish underground either in Warsaw or in
Auschwitz, to return to Nathan several times, and, throughout the novel, to go on living or try to die.
Sophie's decisions in the novel all involve profound
ethical ambiguity. In every case she is constrained by forced
choices in threatening circumstances, chooses the best
course of action she can see, and is then faced with unwanted or evil consequences of her decisions. Sophie recognizes
that her own suffering and that of others was brought
about partly by her choices, and she feels implicated in evil.
She struggles to determine the degree of her culpability.
On one level of her being, Sophie knows that her feelings
of guilt are ~xcessive, extreme, and self-destructive. She
confesses: "In some way I know I should feel no badness
over something I done like that. I see that it was ... beyond
my control, but it is still so terrible to wake up these many
mornings with a memory of that, having to live with it"
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(599). She is tempted to deny that she had any moral
responsibility at all, for in the world of Auschwitz, "you really could not say that this person should have done a certain
thing in a fine or noble fashion, as in the other world ....
You have to understand it, hating it maybe but pitying it at
the same time, because you knew how easy it was for you to
act like an animal too" (349). Sophie resists this temptation
to deny her responsibility; she will not be turned into an
amoral creature. What gives Sophie her nobility and tragic
stature is her ambiguous capacity to accept responsibility
for her deeds, which both represents her resistance to the
dehumanization of Auschwitz and leads to her guilt and
suicide.
Sophie's choice to commit suicide reveals another
form of ambiguity when we interpret its theological meaning for her. Sophie's experience in Auschwitz makes her
believe that God has turned away from her. "I knew that
Christ had turned His face away from me and I could no
longer pray to Him as I did once in Cracow.... I just knew
that only a God, only aJesus who had no pity and who no
longer care for me could permit the people I loved to be
killed and let me live with such guilt" (102-3). Sophie articulates the essential tragic theology: the vision of a God who
has omnipotence-or decisive influence over human destinies-but lacks the moral attributes of the Christian God.
She does not deny the existence of God; she is estranged
because God allowed the Holocaust to happen, and
because Sophie believes God will not forgive her, so that
she must go on living with her crushing burden of guilt
and shame.
Sophie's suicide attempts express her rage at God.
Her earliest attempt in Sweden reveals her desire to commit a blasphemous act. She confesses to Stingo that "I had
this idea that if I killed myself in this church, it would be
the greatest sacrilege I could ever commit" (499-500). For
Sophie, suicide means aggression against God as well as
against herself; it expresses not only self-hatred but rebellion against God. Her suicide note to Stingo, the novel's
narrator, reads as follows:
When I woke I was feeling so terrible and in Despair about
Nathan, bei that I mean so filled with Gilt and thoughts of Death
it was like Ice flowing in my Blut. . . I love Nathan but now feel
this Hate of Life and God. F- God and all his Hande Werk. And
Life too. And even what remain of Love.

The same burden of guilt that makes Sophie hate
God, however, also drives her to search for God's forgiveness, and for a religious solution to her agony. In a paradoxical way Sophie's suicide parallels the demonic act of
Dr. Jemand von Nieman d. the S. S. doctor. Styron suggests
that there was a perverted religious motivation behind this
The Cresset

man's forcing upon Sophie her terrible dilemma. "A failed
believer seeking redemption, groping for renewed faith"
(591). the doctor tried to inflict upon Sophie a totally
unpardonable sin. pr. von Niemand realized that "the
absence of sin and the absence of God were inseparably
connected" (593), and, in his morally numb condition at
Auschwitz, sought to jolt himself into an awareness of God
by committing a supreme sin. 'Was it not supremely simple, then, to restore his belief in God, and at the same time
to affirm his human capacity for evil, by committing the
most intolerable sin that he was able to conceive? Goodness
could come later. But first a choice" (593). Whereas von
Niemand has so little capacity for moral guilt as to be a
demonic figure, Sophie suffers unbearable guilt. Yet by
means of her suicide Sophie, a lapsed Catholic, may also be
trying to force God's hand by committing a terrible evil.
Sophie's suicide represents, as does the S. S. doctor's
supreme evil, an act which by defying God's moral commandments may force a revelation of God to the guilty sinner.
What kind of response might a Christian make to the
suicides of Sophie and Nathan? Styron clearly rejects any
simple religious consolation which fails to confront fully
the pain and suffering which precipitated these deaths. At
the funeral of the two lovers, Stingo is nauseated by the sermon of a Universalist clergyman. If this character is supposed to represent Christian faith, he offers a pathetically
trivialized and sentimentalized version of Christianity.
However, other evidence in the novel reveals that Styron
has a more complex attitude toward Christian faith .
Stingo considers himself an agnostic (613) and says at
one point that he hates the Judea-Christian God ( 463). Yet
in spite of Stingo's rejection of the institutions of
Christianity, and of any religious evasion of the tragedy of
Sophie's life and death, Styron suggests that a religious
response is necessary for Stingo to make sense of events.
Stingo turns instinctively to the Bible when he hears of
deep human suffering. Mter he learns of the brutal torture
and lynching of Bobby Weed in Georgia, lines from
Revelation recur endlessly to him: "And God shall wipe
away all tears from their eyes. And there shall be no more
death, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any
more pain" (86). On his way to discover the joint suicide,
riding a bus next to a Bible-reading black woman, Stingo is
immensely consoled by reading the Old Testament. It is
significant, though, that after the Psalms and Ecclesiastes
and Isaiah, the Sermon on the Mount "didn't work for me;
the grand old Hebrew woe seemed more cathartic, so we
went back to Job" (615). Styron suggests that, in at least
one form of Biblical faith, events like those at the center of
Sophie's Choice are understood as religious experience. For
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the Biblical books Stingo reads describe the unchecked
reign of evil, the suffering of guilt and shame, the uncertainty of redemption, and bitter despair which threatens
but does not finally extinguish hope.
Styron might easily have used the Holocaust and its
decisive influence on Sophie's suicide to reject the legitimacy of traditional monotheistic faith. But he does not.
Stingo asserts that "the most profound statement yet made
about Auschwitz was not a statement at all, but a response.
The query: 'At Auschwitz, tell me, where was God?' And the
answer: 'Where was man?'" (623) Stingo does not, like
Ivan Karamazov, use the deaths of children to prove God's
injustice. Instead he focuses on the sources of human evil,
especially the psychology of the Germans who ran the concentration camps and of white racists in America. Stingo
does not conclude that belief in God is henceforth absurd,
but that "absolute evil is never extinguished from the
world" (623). He affirms that the experience of Sophie's
suffering and death teaches him "the only remaining-perhaps the only bearable-truth. Let your love flow out on all
living things." This precept, he asserts, "springs from the
universe and is the property of God" (623). These words
suggest Stingo's own need for religious faith, and his struggle to believe. For Stingo feels, just as deeply, that
Auschwitz threatens to destroy belief in the possibility of
love. Auschwitz threatens hope.
In the novel's final scene, Stingo goes to Coney
Island, where his tears finally flow freely, in "a letting go of
rage and sorrow for the many others who during these past
months had battered at my mind and now demanded my
mourning ... who were but a few of the beaten and
butchered and betrayed and martyred children of the
earth" (625). Mter this cathartic outpouring, Stingo sleeps,
and awakens to a symbolic resurrection, blessing the children who had protectively covered him with sand. A number of elements in the last few pages of the book suggest
the possibility of finding a positive meaning and even a religious significance in the tragedy of Sophie's life and death:
the poetry Stingo writes, his interpretation of lines by Emily
Dickinson, his view of the significance of Sophie's dying
while listening to Bach's cantata 'Jesu, Joy of Man's
Desiring," and Stingo's affirmation of all the goodness and
beauty he found in the lives of Sophie and Nathan. The
novel makes no simple or untroubled affirmation of religious belief, but dramatizes a narrator's struggle to find
meaning in tragedy, rather like the reflections of Ishmael
in Molly Dick or Jack Burden in Warren's All the King's Men.
This positive meaning is ambiguously religious; faith in
God is neither whole-heartedly affirmed nor clearly denied,
but only hinted at as a possibility.
Many critics and religious thinkers have argued that
tragedy and Christian faith are incompatible, for Christian
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faith goes "beyond tragedy," as Reinhold Niehbur put it, in
asserting that death and destruction are not the last word
about human destiny. If the Christian believes that God
works in the midst of suffering to save all persons from evil,
then even the worst adversity or despairing death-such as
Sophie's suicide-cannot be taken as final, as placing a person beyond redemption. Belief in the immortality of the
soul, too, is said to deprive suffering of its tragic finality.
Therefore, it is usually argued, if the final effect of tragedy
is a sense of the inexorable waste and doom of human
goodness, this tragic vision is finally incompatible with the
Christian affirmation that God supports us through all
things and saves us from the worst evils.
If tragedy is defined as the dramatization of ultimate
failure and waste, then Christianity and tragedy are indeed
incompatible. However, so stark an antithesis between tragic wisdom and Christian faith impoverishes our understanding of both. What is at stake for literary
understanding is considerable. Such a view ignores the
affirmative dimensions of most tragedies, which depict not
only catastrophe but a cathartic restoration of order or a
narrator's struggle to find positive meaning in tragedy. A
deeply Christian dimension of certain tragedies may be the
author's attempt to discern possibilities of goodness and
grace at work in all human experiences. The greatest tragic
works offer insight into both the negativities and the affirmative dimensions of existence. Styron's Sophie's Choice is
such a work. The epigraph for the novel, a quote by Andre
Malraux, epitomizes this work's intense discernment of
both the good and the evil possibilities of life: "I seek that
essential region of the soul where absolute evil confronts
brotherhood."
Sophie's suicide raises in a profound way the question
of God's involvement in events, without resolving this question in a clear affirmation or denial of the legitimacy of
religious faith. Styron implies that Christian faith may be
authentic if it faces and responds to tragedy. Particular
expressions of Christianity may or may not be capable of
affirming belief in God without denying or evading evil.
Sophie's Choice demonstrates that in a literary work religious
faith and tragedy are not incompatible but may be deeply
related. In the last section of this essay I will seek to show
how, from a theological perspective, too, Christian faith
need not preclude a profound awareness of tragedy. Again
the problem of suicide will illuminate what is at stake in the
debate about tragedy and religious faith .
III
Christian theological ethics may regard suicide in
much the same way as the tragedian, that is, as deeply
ambiguous both morally and theologically. Such a view of
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suicide, while espoused by only a portion of the Christian
tradition, has become increasingly attractive to Christian
ethicists, and is exemplified in a striking way by the work of
James Gustafson.
For most of Christian history since Augustine, suicide
has been seen as an unforgivable sin, calling for unequivocal condemnation. Yet in the twentieth century theologians
have been increasingly reluctant to morally condemn suicide. Such reflections show a more profound awareness of
the ethical ambiguity of suicide than has characterized
much of the Christian tradition. In part this tendency
demonstrates increasing understanding of the role of
depression, mental illness, and possible genetic factors in
precipitating many suicides.
In the chapter on suicide in volume two of his Ethics
from a Theocentric Perspective, James Gustafson speaks of suicide as a tragic act, in that "the person does what is irreversible and irrevocable, i.e., dies, because he or she thinks
it is the right thing to do, and has no other choice" (187).
He criticizes judgments which focus on suicide as an isolated act, apart from a person's intentions or circumstances.
"If ethical reflection on suicide is confined only to the act,
and excludes the conditions in which the act appears to the
agent to be a good or even right one, it is morally myopic if
not blind" (212). This call to attend to the agent's perspective does not mean that Gustafson judges every suicide to
be morally justifiable; he explains how errors of judgment
and failures of imagination can lead to suicide. Speaking of
the problem of misplaced guilt, for example, which I have
held is Sophie's central mistake, Gustafson holds that this
error often comes about from a failure to accept the limits
and conditions of finitude:
The error of the excessive scrupulous conscience is often
that it assumes moral responsibility where there is no causal relationship between the person and the course of events .... The
failure to accept the conditions of finitude can lead to misplaced
guilt; the failure to recognize that one's own actions are only a
small part in the ongoing processes of interaction in which many
others exercise powers can lead to unbearable senses of responsibility. (205)
Here Gustafson criticizes the suicide's self-understanding, yet the tone and the intent of his analysis is not
simply moralistic condemnation, but empathetic discernment of the human needs expressed in suicide. And in
some situations he holds that suicide may be a morally
proper choice to which others should consent: "Suicide is
always a tragic moral choice; it is sometimes a misguided
choice. But it can be, I believe, a conscientious choice. Our
first responsibility from my theocentric perspective is to
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sustain others and the relationships which make life worth
living; another is to restrain persons from the act if we have
opportunity to do so; but finally we often must consent to
its being done-justifiably, tragically, and mournfully"
(215). Gustafson's analysis of the ethical ambiguity of suicide illustrates a pronounced tendency in recent Christian
ethics and resembles a central theme of a tragic author
such as William Styron.
Where Gustafson diverges from most Christian
thinkers, however, is in his appreciation of how suicide raises theological questions. His final paragraph on suicide
suggests a tragic theology:
If the powers of destruction that bear down upon individuals are insurmountable, if there is no other reasonable choice for
them to make in the face of unbearable and unbelievable suffering, if persons are not significantly causally accountable for the
bleakness of their Jives and the circumstances in which they live,
and if there is nothing or almost nothing that those in whose care
they are can do for them, there is reason to quarrel with God. Life
is a gift, and is to be received with gratitude, but if life becomes an
unbearable burden there is reason for enmity toward God ....
Finally one has to consent to the reality that the powers that bring
life into being do not always sustain it but can lead to its untimely
and tragic destruction. (215-16)
This passage suggests the "hostile deity," the "malevolent transcendence," and the "unavowable theology" of the
tragic vision, to use. Paul Ricoeur's terms. Although this
view of God must be qualified by many other affirmations
in Gustafson's two volumes, it asserts the legitimacy of the
tragic vision as one component or aspect of Christian theology. Gustafson's work reveals, I think, as close an approximation of tragic theology as is possible for a thinker
working within the constraints of the Christian tradition. In
fact, for many of his critics, Gustafson's theological vision
would fall outside the bounds of Christian orthodoxy. If
God is seen at work in "the powers that bear down on us,"
specifically in the forces that converge on a suicide, this
seems to compromise the Christian affirmation that God is
ultimately for every human being, loving and providentially
working for the salvation of each human soul. In my view,
Gustafson's theological vision is fully and convincingly
Christian. Yet it lies on one extreme of the spectrum of theological responses to the problem of evil, and threatens to
compromise the affirmation of God's goodness. What are
the limits of Christian faith's capacity to absorb the tragic
vision?
Tragic theology arises when the sources of evil in
experience are traced beyond human sin, and these
sources are interpreted in relation to God. At least four
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constraints limit the construction of a "tragic theology."
First, the goodness of God may be mysterious and even-at
moments-incomprehensible, but God cannot be wicked
or indifferent to human need, or the theologian has abandoned Christian faith . Second, the Christian cannot assert
that human goodness is ultimately and eternally doomed,
and that self-destruction is the last word about human destiny. Christian beliefs about Providence and eschatology
constrain the elaboration of a theology shaped by any tragic vision which implies the unredeemable destruction and
ultimate failure and waste of goodness.
Third, philosophical and theological speculation on
the world-view of tragedy often produces an ontology
which sees reality as fragmented and doomed to selfdestructive internal conflict. Such a view conflicts with the
Christian understanding of creation. God created a world
whose basic unity is not fractured and whose basic goodness is not jeopardized by the various forms of suffering to
which creatures are subject. There is a crucial difference
between the Christian's necessary recognition of particular
tragedies contingent on specific circumstances and the
construction of a world-view which posits tragedy as a universal, inevitable, or ontologically necessary feature of
experience.
There is a fourth, very practical danger when tragic
wisdom becomes articulated in speculative form as a philosophy or theology: the risk of fatalism. In attempts to articulate conceptually tragedy's deepest implications, humans
seem predestined to doom. The waste of goodness
becomes not a contingent event, but an instance of a universal law. This pessimistic view leads directly to hopelessness and despair. Christian faith counsels against such
despair, and I think its hopeful theological affirmations
should-though they clearly do not always-have practical
implications as believers face the future. In each of these
ways, Christian beliefs cannot easily be reconciled with the
tragic vision.
Nonetheless, it is necessary for Christian theology to
incorporate the insights of the tragic, as Gustafson does
implicitly in his discussion of suicide. For there is a constant danger in Christian experience and theology of
affirming prematurely that we are "beyond tragedy," a danger that makes Christians sometimes seem naive about evil
or prone to gloss over the suffering of others. Gustafson's
work is not primarily concerned with the tragic vision, but
with criticizing anthropocentrism. However, his work is a
good example of how Christians can appropriate the
insights of the tragic vision.
The problem of suicide crystallizes what is at stake in
the discussion of tragedy and Christian belief. If we see
every suicide-whether in literature or in life-as simply
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morally wrong, we fail to recognize the ethical complexity
of the deed and of the person. In Sophie's case, we would
see only her misplaced judgment about her own guilt, only
a wrong headed and disturbed need for self-punishment.
We would not see how her self-destruction also grows out
of Sophie's basic goodness of character, her deep love of
her children, and her passionate desire for a full life. We
would be blind to the way her suicide is related to her
capacity and need to take responsibility for her actions, and
to her needs for repentance, atonement, and renewed relationship with God. Even when we judge a suicide to have
made a morally wrong choice, there is the further issue of
how we articulate that judgment, in what tone and with
what qualifications. Tragedy might have an educative role
in helping Christians not only to make better moral judgments, but to express them with awareness of the ambiguities involved in any suicide.

A theology with a sense of the tragic discerns not
only the moral ambiguity of a suicide, but the theological
ambiguity of God's relationship to human suffering. A suicide may provoke questioning of God's justice and providence, and even anger and quarreling with God. These are
significant aspects of the Christian relationship with God.
Loss of the tragic sense makes faith blithely optimistic, and
ignores the mysterious and fearful elements of God's relationship to human history. While some of his critics find
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Gustafson's theocentric ethics to be not only lacking in
concern for human welfare, but even positing an indifferent or malevolent God, I see an authentic and persuasive
Christian piety in his description of how believers may be
moved to trust in powers that do not always work for their
own welfare or that of those they love. Tragic theology
sounds much like Job in his despair and his faith: 'Though
he slay me yet will I trust in him." In his chapter on suicide
Gustafson unmistakably reveals a tragic sensibility as he
explores the ethical ambiguity of this act, and reflects on
the theological implications of the powers that bear down
on a suicide.
The Christian's response to suicide may in crucial
ways resemble the insights of the tragic writer. Between the
treatment of suicide in Sophie's Choice and Gustafson's analysis in Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective there are four significant analogies: 1) both writers stress the ethical
ambiguity of suicide, 2) Styron and Gustafson both trace
the causes of suicide beyond the suicide's own will to the
environment and finally to God, 3) both thinkers see certain forms of Christian belief as glib, superficial, and evasive in denying the full reality of evil, 4) each writer
nonetheless holds open the possibility of a monotheistic
faith which does not shirk the tragic aspects of history. One
may believe and trust in God while continuing to wrestle
with the problem of how to understand God's relation to
evil. 0
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MITAK' OYASI':

THREE LITURGICAL MEDITATIONS

Tom Christenson
First Communion at Forty-Nine

It is already night as we line up to go in, seventeen of
us, men, women, an'd children. We duck the big flap and
crawl hands and knees in line to the left into the darkness
of the lodge. I am very aware of the pit of red-hot rocks to
my right, forty-one of them I am told later.
The line stops. I squat in my place. I still believe this
will be like a sauna. I feel the frame of willow boughs and
the rough jute backing of discarded carpet against my back
and shoulders. The flap is closed. The darkness is opaque. I
feel the first of several stages of panic. Suddenly the ecstatic
song begins in a high scream. I am reminded of a wounded
animal. The leader's voice descends, and I can now hear it
as a song. All the others join in. The song is loud, very
loud, in the small closed hut. The blackness makes it even
louder. I do not know the words but I certainly hear the
song. I do not even hear it as words, yet the singing invades
me.
A prayer is made to the great mystery and to Iktomi
the spider. Four scoops of water are thrown on the rocks
which crack and sizzle. The steam arrives too soon. It
attacks me, assaults me. I pull away against the back of the
lodge. Four more scoops are thrown. I cover my face with
my hands, trying to filter the burning air, afraid of what it is
doing to my lungs. But everyone else starts singing loudly
again, men, women, and children. I am ashamed, thankful
for the darkness to hide in.
Now many long prayers begin. My skin burns, my
knees ache. I suffer as I never have in church, here from
pain and fear, not boredom. I hear someone praying for
me even though they don't yet know my name. More water
is poured. My face now feels as if it is touching a hot stove. I
want to escape but there is no easy place to go. I believe I
can hear my flesh cooking like steamed chicken, getting
white and firm. I think I will die now for my blood is
cooked and will not flow. Then I remember those all
Tom Christenson teaches in the Department of Philosophy at
Capital University. He describes himself as a Lutheran who seeks
to honor all traditions in whose midst he has been surprised by
grace. The "Dakota Hymns" in this article are his attempt to render in English the spirit of this religious expression. The phrase
"Mitak' Oyasi' " means "we are all relatives" and extends beyond
the human participants to all the elements present in celebration.
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around me. They have done this before and survived it. I
laugh at myself in my own pain. I envision my wife and children. They look but don't seem to see me. When it is my
turn to pray, I pray for them.
More water is poured. Will this never end? I think it
cannot possibly get any hotter, but it always does. The
singing now becomes wilder. I discover myself singing too.
I do not know the words. I do not even hear words. But the
song, like the steam, is an invading army and I have surrendered. The singing stops-a long, dense silence. The leader gives some signal, the flap is thrown open. A slight whiff
of cool air reaches me. I gasp at it like a drowning man,
afraid I won't get any more. Now the cool night air circles
in. I breathe deeply, slowly. What gracious relie£1
We all crawl out, stumble, then stand. The steam
rises, made pink by the firelight, hovering over us like our
own ghosts. I spread out my arms. I feel like swimming in
the night. I look up. The stars are only half as far away, and
have brought all their relatives. A ten year old child comes
up to me, shakes my hand and congratulates me on my
endurance. Both of us laugh out loud. Others have
stretched out in the damp grass, I do too. There is quiet
talking around me and some soft singing. A coyote laughs a
few hills away. Now I know what he's laughing at.
I dry off, get dressed. I am invited to join the family
for supper. It is 1:10 in the morning. I accept.
Three Dakota Hymns

LAMENTATION
Remember, 0 great spirit, what has become of us.
Look on us and see what has been done to us.
Remember us, bring us back and we will come.
Renew us as dwellers in the land,
Feed us with new strength and the old wisdom,
Open our ears to the song of the elders and the hopes
of the young,
That we may be a sign to all peoples
And a way of return.
Bring us back to the great fire circle where all are
one family.
Remember, 0 great spirit, what has become of us.
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ECSTATIC SONG
Overtake us, 0 great spirit and overcome us.
Overcome us, 0 sun, blazing heat of day,
Make us sweat and thirst and faint.
Overcome us, 0 .great sun.
Overcome us, 0 great wind,
High weather-maker in the west.
Blow our fringes straight, blow the long grasses,
Bring the deep thunder, the lightning and rain,
Beat the gray waves against our small boat.
Overcome us, 0 great wind.
Overcome us, 0 great fire,
Red-glowing rocks of the sweat lodge,
Open our bodies and invade us,
Open our minds and clean us,
Sting us 'til we cry out.
Overcome us, 0 great fire.
Overcome us, circling eagle,
Laughing coyote, silent deepwater catfish,
See us with your eyes.
Measure us and judge our dancing and singing,
Overcome us in the dance and song.
Overcome us, 0 .great eagle.
Overcome us, 0 great mother,
Overtake your children:
The grasses and wild sage,
The chokeberry and the corn,
Gopher, coiling snake and mighty bison,
We are all your children
Overcome us, 0 great mother.

We receive this food,
Fresh water and salt,
Gift of the earth,
Mitak' oyasi'.
We receive this food,
Cabbage, turnip and plum,
Work of the sun and rain,
Mi tak' oyasi'.
We receive this food,
Song, story and dance,
Gifts of the great spirit through our
ancestors.
Mitak' oyasi'.

A Place to Practice Justice

Thus says the Lord. ..
I hate, I reject your festivals,
Nor do I delight in your solemn assemblies.
Even though you offer me burnt offerings
and grain offerings
I will not accept them;
And I will not even look at the
peace offerings of your fatlings.
Take away from me the noise of your songs;
I will not even listen to the sound of your
harps.
But let justice roll down like a might)•river,
And let righteousness like an ever flowing stream.
Amos, 5:21-24

Overtake us, 0 great spirit and overcome us.

THANKSGIVING
We receive this food,
Bread, cheese and soup,
The work of many brothers and sisters,
Mitak' oyasi' .
We receive this food ,
Root, stem and fruit,
The lives of plants,
Mitak' oyasi'.
We receive this food ,
Flank, breast and egg,
The lives of animals,
Mitak' oyasi'.
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What is the proper business of the faithful? What is it
we do when we do the service of God? Many of us would
reply that the nature of such service is worship and the
form, liturgical. The work of the pastor or priest is surely
doing God's work and that is mainly to proclaim God's
word and to lead in worship. But Amos reminds us that
both proclamation and worship may be hateful to God. Not
because the place of worship and the songs are not beautiful, not because the ritual is wrongly done, but because
they do not flow out of and into a life of justice.
A little more than a year ago in a place where the tensions between a native American tribe and its neighbors
had reached the point of threats of violence, some of the
wisest of the tribal leaders persuaded the tribe to hold a
pow-wow followed by a sacred feast and to make a special
effort to get their white neighbors to come and dance and
celebrate a feast of reconciliation and peace. Only 20 of the
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white neighbors came, enjoyed the dancing, then joined
the family circle to take part as equals in the sacred communal meal. Mterward short speeches of thanksgiving and
reconciliation were offered, both by the tribal leaders and
by the white neighbors, two of which were Christian clergy,
one a Catholic priest, the other a Lutheran pastor.
Mter the ceremony I cornered the two clergymen and
said,"Now you should return the favor. Ask all these people
to join you in your sacred feast of reconciliation and peace,
holy communion." Without the least embarrassment they
pointed out to me that neither of them could even share
communion with the other, to say nothing of sharing communion with these "unbaptized pagans."
The words of Amos came to my mind and in a rush of
emotion I spoke those opening lines:
I hate, I reject your festivals.
Nor do I delight in your solemn assemblies.
Both were very shocked and finally one responded,
"Of course, if it were up to me I would be happy to do this,
but the congregation could have the Bishop on my case
immediately."
Do we not all come to God's table as sinners? Is communion not the occasion for asking forgiveness and forgiving, a meal of thanksgiving and reconciliation? I believe it
is. Then why in God's name are we not able to share it with
other Christians and all people? Are we not saying in effect,
'This is a private party between us and God, you have not
been invited and are not good enough to take part?"
This brings me to raise another question: What would
our festivals, our assemblies, our songs and offerings look
like if they truly flowed out of a love for justice?
1. We would have to give up the idea that these
things work religiously because of what we do. We should
already know that, but often forget that we are celebrating
something that is true apart from our ceremonies. Is this
not, after all, the essential difference between magic and
religion? In the eucharist we are, as the Greek word should
tell us, giving thanksgiving for something already donenot magically making it happen. It's because we are already
gifted, forgiven, reconciled, that we gather to recognize
and ourselves realize what is already the case. The ceremony is the icon of the reality, not the cause of the reality. In
baptism we celebrate that a new son or daughter is a child
of God. We do not by some kind of exclusive magic make
him / her one. The idea that a child who dies before the
ceremony of baptism is not a child of God is heinous,
vicious, and based on a mistake. To make the ceremony a
requirement before one can join the family of God at the
communal meal is just as serious. We are all children of
God, not because of what we have done but because of
what God has done. The ceremony is for us, to help us
remember and realize the reality. We must once and for all
recognize the blasphemy of selling denominational tickets
to the meal that God has prepared. Jesus ate so as to break
down the barriers of religious propriety. Do we dare build
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them up again by our own exclusive patterns of eating?
2. Our liturgy is worse than useless if it does not
inform our practice. We, like Amos' contemporaries, are
very good at producing excellent liturgies and rituals in
beautiful temples accompanied by awesome trappings and
music. We are very poor at taking anything that happens
there into the practical world with us. This is so, I am convinced, because we do not fundamentally believe that what
is iconized in the liturgy is reality. If anything, it is a wishworld reality for us, a kind of religious Disneyland, not connected in any essential way to the real world of our work,
home and society. If we believed the reality that the
eucharist gives us we would realize in our weekday world
that everything comes to us as a gift and that we are all children of one father who is bent on the reconciliation of
each to all.
3. One of the functions of liturgy is to iconize reality.
The other is to practice us in living that reality. If this is so
where are the liturgies for the realities we confess? Where is
the liturgy that iconizes our being stewards of the creation?
Where is the liturgy that iconizes our calling to lives of service, stewardship, justice, love for neighbor? Where do
Lutherans iconize their belief in the priesthood of all
believers? We still ordain only clergy. Why not plumbers,
teachers, farmers, parents, managers?
We need to take our liturgies seriously. But few of us
do because few of our liturgies take us seriously. What is
required is a marriage between ritual and praxis where
both are shaped by the realities we confess: God's creative,
sustaining and redeeming acts.
Amos bears witness to the fact that the religious, our
response to the word of God, is not located in some separate slice of reality but is firmly situated in the economic,
social, legal, political, family, and educational world; the
world where litigation is confused for justice, where children, the poor, and the aged are abused, where we make
money off of other people's dire needs, where racism and
sexism are the rule, not the exception. Amos' message is
that the socio-political-economic world is God's world. It is
how we work here, how we tolerate systemic injustice here,
how we seek justice here that really matters. Only when
that has been attended to will our rituals, ceremonies, and
pious songs be anything but hateful to God.
Let justice roll down like a mighty river,
And righteousness like an ever flowing stream.

15

The Chosen
1. The Birthright
"And Esau said, Behold I am at the point to die,
and what profit shall this birthright do me?"

Even in the womb I was stronger,
wrestling him til day broke,
and he gripped my heel, but I was first
to see light. So what did it matter
feeling alone all my childhood,
hearing our mother's voice grow softer
when she spoke to him, our father,
silent as always, silent as his God?
That day after the hunt, seeing
I could barely walk, hunger
a wolf tearing my gut, he ran
across the field calling Brother,
the sun risen behind him
so he looked a king, or god,
on a coin's gold disk, my skin seared
by light that cast him on the horizon.
I expected only my due. Helping me
to the kitchen, I heard him whisper
Give me your birthright
and I'll give you food, his eyes

a priest's plying a convert.
I smelled soup simmering over the fire,
coals glowing raw under the crock.
I ate, and knew a greater hunger.
Now, wandering these fields,
coming home after a kill, I wonder:
was it choice, fate, a final betrayal
that made me what I am? Sometimes
I wish I was never born to a world
where God's favor's won with a lie.
Then I curse my mother and her son,
the bitch land, and I curse the light.

2. The Blessing
"And Isaac loved Esau because he did eat
of his venison. But Rebekah loved Jacob."

For months my body
was a battlefield,
and I cursed God
for granting the miracle.
On my day, alone,
I squatted beside a streameven in pain, I knew God
had betrayed me: a horror,
hairy as a dog
from head to foot.
Then I saw the perfect white hand
clutching at the heel,
and cried out praises to the Lord.
Why shouldn't the second
receive the blessing?
Only I could see he was God's favorite
though I loved both my sons.
That day of my husband's death,
the one left to hunt
his father's supper,
and I told the other
Go slaughter a goat
and fix it for )'Our father
and wear its pelt about your hands
and on the nape of your neck
and you shall get the blessing.

Why shouldn't he?
Was he not the chosen,
my Jacob, my beautiful?

by Daniel Tobin
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3. Father and Son
"And Abraham took the wood of the burnt offering
and laid it on Isaac his son. . . "

I heard my mother sobbing
prostrate in the tent
behind us as we made
for the wilderness, the other boys
gathered for their games.
He didn't hold my hand,
the glint in his eyes
sharp as the blade
sheathed beneath his robes.
Did he think I didn't see,
did he think I didn't know
he'd heard that Voice?
Ahead, the mountain
jutted on the horizon,
a heap of spent stones,
jagged bone pile.
All the way he was silent,
leading me up the path
like any goat or sheep.
Then: the altar,
dried run-offs of blood,
wing-flaps, everything below picked clean.
Did he think as I lay there
the pyre a temple around me,
his hand holding the knife to my throat,
I would cry out?
I sank into the stone.
So when the blade withdrew
and he raised me with his arms,
weeping, crying God's praises,
I felt nothing, being already
the given lamb.

4. The Chosen
"And jacob was left alone; and there wrestled
a man with him until the breaking of the day. "

My father's silence echoed like a curse
in that house. My brother smelled of earth.
My mother whispered You're the chosen
in my ear, until nothing else made sense.
In that barren place where I slept, stone
for pillow, I watched a ladder ascend
into heaven, gatherings of angels,
and God above it, a pure light, calling
Your seed will be as plentiful as the dust.

I believed it. What else could justify
a brother's yoke? So now these wives,
these sons, the land that will be mine forever.
What else is there to say: lies conquer,
though some repent while others suffer,
and the God we dream assumes our face
in whose image we fashion future and past.
To be chosen is maybe to know this
and still find light enough to praise,
though every moment harbors that angel
who will one day take away your name.

The Voice From the Ladder

We are only angels.
Sometimes, when light
slants through a train of clouds,
and wind shudders through long
hours of night, someone will cry out
in loneliness or grief: Lord!
and may see us gathered there,
and may try to hold us,
or call others shouting
I saw God, heard God's voice,

Now my sons come to me
each for his blessing;
and they shall get their due,
older and younger
according to the law:
What is God but the place of choice,
the sharpened edgewhat happens, happens.
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and they will follow him,
though they have no knowledge
of our path through emptiness,
terrible, like houses of the dead.
An artist paints pictures,
a poet writes poems.
But what human image
can rescue truth from belief?
We are only angels,
what do we know,
our wings beating furiously
against heaven's trap door?
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REFLECTIONS AFTER A VISIT TO THE U.S.
HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL
James F. Moore

T he Holocaust has become part of the American
mainstream. Once Steven Spielberg takes up the cause in
film, then the story of the Holocaust has been moved from
the periphery of our consciousness to the heart of
Americana 1994. And that is exactly what has happened,
for better or worse. The inescapable sense thrust upon the
visitor to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum is this same
feeling that the stories of the Holocaust have been moved
from the periphery of American life to the center, to the
mall in Washington D.C., next to the Bureau of Engraving
and Printing. For the visitor who happens upon this series
of documents, news-clippings, pictures, and stories for the
first time, the inevitable question lurks-What is this doing
here in the U.S. capital, in the area where other museums
of the Smithsonian document subjects so very different
from this one, subjects that point mostly to human achievement and struggle. This one leads the visitor down the
path of human depravity and senseless suffering. So the
visitor is impressed, even overwhelmed, but is still asking
why?
My visit was my first to this museum, but the stories,
the documents, the clippings, the historical detail, the pictures are part of my own ten year odyssey attempting to

James Moore teaches in the Department of Theology at VU, where
he teaches a couTSe on the Holocaust. His book on Holocaust theolog:)'-Christian Theology After the Shoah-has recently
appeared from the University Press of America.
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understand the meaning of these events we call the
Holocaust. I have seen these things before in countless
books, and at Dachau, at Auschwitz, at Yad Vashem in
Jerusalem, and other museums in London, Paris, Prague,
Amsterdam, and Chicago . I am still overwhelmed by all
that is displayed in these things, but I look at such museums with another eye, the view of one who wonders not
why this museum is here in Washington , D.C., but rather
why has it taken so long for this memorial to come here. I
do not wonder how it is that now after all these years the
Holocaust has become part of the American mainstream,
but rather I have known for some time now that the
Holocaust is one of those events that will forever be a
reflection on the heart of America, a reflection that we are
long overdue in coming to terms with. Let me return to
these thoughts later, but for now I turn to reflections on
my visit to the museum.

I had heard Michael Berenbaum, the museum's
director, talk about the layout and the intent of the museum exhibits a year before the museum actually opened. I
knew that certain things were done to help personalize the
visit to the museum; the most interesting is the entry card
that matches each visitor with a victim, someone whose personal story could be set into the more impersonal data of
the documents. My card linked me with a Polish boy
(Israel Kisielnicki) who lived in a small Polish village
(Kaluszyn) prior to the forming of the ghetto in Kaluszyn
and his death from typhus in the ghetto before 1942. The
The Cresset

few details about the boy's short life began to unfold in
larger terms as I was led station by station through detailed
descriptions of pre-war Poland (and other Jewish communities) and the details of the ghettoes and the camps. I
found that effort could produce further clues about the
fateful journey that this boy I was matched with traveled on
his way to death. These efforts to personalize the visit to
the museum manag.e to draw the visitor in without overdramatizing and emotionalizing our reaction. I was glad
for this feature of my visit.
But, I must say, the journey to and through the museum was odd for me, an oddness that is an important
dimension of this particular museum and this visit as compared with other places I have been. This is the first museum that required no special effort to find. Even Anne
Frank's hiding place in Amsterdam is off the main, busy
areas. The Jewish Museum in London is to be found in a
quiet square removed from the busy tourist spots of
London. The Holocaust memorial in Paris is under the
road of a bridge near the cathedral of Notre Dame. It
would be missed if one is not looking for it. The fine museum and study center at Yad Vashem in Jerusalem is out of
the city on a hill, certainly a majestic view but removed
from the busy areas of Jerusalem. To visit the U.S.
Memorial, I took the underground to the Smithsonian exit
and walked a block and a half. It is located in the center of
the tourist section of Washington, D.C. The sites in
Europe are often located at places of the Holocaust.
Auschwitz is found in a small city in Western Poland requiring at the time several days of journey by train to finally
reach this striking monument to death. It was, indeed, odd
that this memorial was, unlike the others, set into tourist,
commercial Americana.
Because of this oddness, I did ask why it was here. I
wondered not so much why such a museum is built but why
it was built at that particular location. I could not help but
think that a visitor could spend a time at the Holocaust
museum as one stop along a string of visits to say the
Natural History Museum, the Museum of American
History, the Air and Space Museum. And this swing of
museums could potentially occur one after the other with
maybe a break for lunch. Could a tourist actually do that,
move from this museum to another as if they are on a par,
doing the same thing? Wouldn't there be just a little strain
on a person's sense of perspective, on the radical, even jarring clash of subject matter that would say to us that this
can't be done? Wouldn't we look for somewhere to contemplate, to find a quiet place removed from all the rest
just to recover from the overwhelming impact of what we
are shown by a full visit to the Holocaust Memorial? I wanted just to leave the museum and leave the mall immediate-
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ly after my visit. I could not imagine staying to take in the
other "sights" after this visit. Was I too emotional about
this visit? Had I overreacted? I wonder.
But this was not the only oddness about this museum.
The other places somehow had a natural connection with
the events being described. Auschwitz was a piece of the
memorial, it was the symbol that confronts the visitor.
Even the village of Oswecim is part of the experience, as
paradoxical as the part may be. Dachau is also part of the
history being described and the Bavarian village that is
Dachau is a striking setting for this visit, even as it is also
paradoxical. But this museum requires a retreat into
another world. Somehow the visitor is made to strain to
link the world of our capital with the world of Dachau,
Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Teresianstadt, Treblinka. And
that strain to connect means that the visitor comes in disconnected, unprepared for the world being described.
This disconnection is an odd feeling that is made even
stranger by the realization that our humanity cannot keep
us disconnected. Our feelings are aroused from the very
beginning. How can we help but be drawn in? but this is
being drawn into a world not the same as the one we left,
but a world almost fantastic, almost unbelievable beyond
the suspended belief that I felt entering Auschwitz. Again,
I wondered if I was overreacting. I don't think I was, really.
Then, the museum is odd in its layout. The architects of this museum have done a marvelous service for the
visitor, putting us almost immediately into a world of gray
concrete and steel, a cold facade that further sharpens the
contrast. There is a sense of foreboding as we walk further
into the exhibits, a sense of being swallowed up by an evil
place, the feeling that oozes from the buildings at
Auschwitz. I knew that feeling; a feeling of not wanting to
be there. A feeling of being too close to evil, of being captured and put in the same prison as so many others. It is a
feeling that is inescapable at Auschwitz and also here in
Washington. Even the coldness of facts and figures, of historical detail, of pictures of naked bodies running in front
of shotguns and pistols, of piles of corpses that became
masses at every one of these locations, sites of death and
murder begins to creep over the visitor like a trap that cannot help but overwhelm us. This is the dark side of our
humanity and we are connected. We know that these
things happened in our time, in a Christian land, perpetrated by human beings not so different from us. This is
the oddness that comes with any visit to a memorial to the
Holocaust. I felt it in this memorial in Washington. I am
sure I was not alone.
This journey was odd in many ways, but the visit itself
was also filled with surprises that impressed me and made
me glad for the visit. One of those surprises came with the
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policy of the museum to allow only groups of 20 or so into
the main exhibits at a time. Thus, we went at our own pace
unencumbered by crowds hoping to move closer to a display or see a film clipa little longer. This was a museum in
which the visitor could linger and think and put together
what they were seeing. In order to increase this sense of
control over one's own visit, individual observing booths
were strategically placed, especially in displaying particularly upsetting material. Thus, any visitor could literally be
alone with their thoughts and the details of that particular
exhibit. This feature struck me as a surprising and thoroughly effective way to move the museum beyond the normal sense of a museum. Naturally much depends on the
instincts of the visitor, but this place allowed me to become
absorbed by the story and the documents. I could become
a student, an observer, even a participant without the usual
distractions that break the spell of all that.

I was struck by the silence. No one talked in this
place. No one!! This visit was not intended as a group
experience except in the way that we could be joined by
our feelings, our anger, our disappointment, our sympathy,
our sorrow. And that is what did join us in this visit. There
was no call for conversation about these things. In a way
more surprising than I thought, this museum captures the
sense that all of us, students of the Holocaust, have said:
silence is the most appropriate response to this story of
horror. But that is also true of our awe at the courage, the
compassion of those who stood by others, those who
reached out to help and even rescue. This set of events
confronts the observer with all the extremes of horrid inhumanity and unbelievable nobility. And the faces get to me.
Every time I look at the faces I cease being an observer. I
thought of the Polish boy whose biography was briefly written on my entry card, and his face became real to me. And
what can be said that adds anything to what is seen and
felt? So I was taken by the remarkable silence of this visit,
saying to myself that I am pleased that at this U.S.
Holocaust memorial there was silence as we walked the
journey to Auschwitz.
There was also the meaning captured between the
displays, filling the empty spaces. At one point there were
shoes; piles and piles of shoes that were here even though
they were first found at Auschwitz-Birkenau. Along another space crossing a bridge we were surrounded by the faces
of a Jewish shtetl (this village one that no longer exists).
These walls were covered with pictures of life from ceiling
to floor down through the next levels. We would pass by
again in these in-between spaces and see remnants of life
that is no more. As we moved to the exit there was the theater in which voices of survivors spoke their witness, and
people cried both on the screen and among those watch-
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ing. These were good tears, important tears. They were a
sign that we had made the journey, the real journey. This
is the journey not just through the many sides of the story,
the details and the pictures. This is the journey not merely
through the exhibits of a museum. This was the journey
from the detached visitor who enters from the busy activity
of the Washington Mall to another world. We had made
the story ours. And the more the story had become ours,
the more we wept. Roy Eckardt has said that the one thing
we, Jews and Christians, can do together now is to weep
together. This final scene of the visit is a testimony to the
truth of Eckardt's words.
The problem with this visit is the unique way that I as
an American experienced this journey. At the end of the
visit I did not want to leave because I knew that to leave
meant coming out into the city again, getting onto a train
again. Having made the journey toward weeping with the
survivors, I was not ready to come out into the city. And
this is our special difficulty, we Americans that is. For we
leave this world of the museum and return to our world, to
the heart of Americana. And we wonder how it can fit
together. We know, in fact, that it doesn't fit together. Try
as we might, we know that this scene of death and hatred,
courage and compassion was played out somewhere else.
This is not America's story even if we know that we have
other stories that are ours, that remind us of our bitter and
our heroic past. Something is missing in a museum if all
we are finally led to is the closing scene of weeping with the
survivors. And this is the great dilemma of a museum on
the Holocaust. This is a splendid museum, but it is none
the less a museum.
Two features of this place, however , give hope for
something more. First, woven into the stories of destruction and of personal survival and courage is another story,
the story of America and the Holocaust. That story has
been told in a variety of ways through book and film, but to
tell that story here in this museum was an important statement to American visitors. We cannot remove our world
from the world of Auschwitz as easily as we might think, any
more than American leaders can remove themselves from
the political, humanitarian issues that plague the story of
America's involvement. We know of the isolationists who
not only kept us from entering the war but also kept politicians from making the death of Jews and others in death
camps a political issue. Fear of what special action on the
Jewish question might mean finally led American leaders to
do little or nothing until it was almost too late. And we
have come to see that much was known; we were not ignorant of what was happening. It was too easy to say that
Europe was not our problem, not our story. This story of
fear and reluctance, of standing by and doing nothing (not
The Cresset

even filling immigration quotas to their already set levels or
refusing entry to Jews placed on ships in order to get rid of
them), that story is told at our U.S. Holocaust Memorial. It
is too simplistic to say "never again," for what we need is
thoughtful consideration of what this means when a nation
as powerful as ours can become frozen, paralyzed at a time
when even some action might have meant a difference.
Leaving the museum and coming into this land again
meant leaving with this story, this dilemma heavy on our
minds and sensitivities.
There is more, though. The architects of this memorial decided early ir.1 the planning that a museum could
only be part of our nation's response. The museum is the
public witness to the story and our story; the public commitment to remember. Still, the most promising activity of
this place is not the public exhibits but the ongoing work
of teachers and scholars, people dedicated to the project to
teach and keep teaching, to think the hard questions, to
explore with thoroughness the data and documents. This,
you see, is a learning center, a center for teaching classes
and being taught how to teach classes. This is a center for
research and exploration of the many dimensions of this
event that continue to challenge us, searching for ways that
the commitment to "never again" can actually take on reality and credibility. But this powerful memorial to the victims and survivors, the partisans and resistors and rescuers
is not really visible to the visitor who takes this odd, surprising and transforming journey by visiting the museum.
Even so, this work of learning and teaching, studying and
reflecting that moves beyond the stories to connect with
our present lives may be the most powerful memorial of all.
We shall see.
The continuing question plagues us as we think
about the U.S. Holocaust Museum, why now and why this?
A full generation after has now, long ago, moved beyond
the actually history of the Holocaust. There are diminishing traces of these events as both the survivors and the
marks and the sites disappear. This generation is at a critical juncture of losing touch with the events and their
meaning. Much has happened, even, that makes this generation believe that we have overcome the sins of the past.
Perhaps it is still true that what we forget we are condemned to repeat, but many are confident that they are
not what their parents or grandparents were. Believing
that there is an implicit memory that we can trust, that
makes us different, this generation may feel it is time to
move on. So we ask again, why does this museum appear
now seemingly too late for its purpose? This is not a silly
question. It is a question worth asking not only here in
these reflections but for each of us.
Amid all this sense of moving on there is also some-
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thing else. This generation that now succeeds us is the heir
to accumulated hatred and bitterness to an extent that may
be unprecedented. Rivalries and hatreds tear at the fabric
of almost every society, every outpost of civilization in our
world. On the one hand we despair that we have, perhaps
can have, learned nothing from our past. These little outbreaks of devastation found in Somalia, Ireland, Bosnia,
Russia, Azerbaydzhan, Israel, Germany, Poland, our own
inner cities, South Africa are endless, quite literally. We
are so tired of this violence that we are tempted to turn
away to a simpler life. We leave the museum with the sense
of wanting to cleanse ourselves, wash away the memories.
After all, what can we do? and, of course, many of us were
not even born then. We are not likely to find this feeling
changing. The despair I speak of constantly lurks like the
emptiness that survivors like Elie Wiesel or Primo Levi
speak about as they saw Auschwitz for the first time. The
more we hear stories of the depths of depravity and despair
the more we feel it is hopeless, the more we think why not
forget? Our question "Why now?" rings loudly in our ears.
Why can't we just get away, just forget? Why can't we just
get on with things? Except that it is a fantasy we hold onto
that we can get away, that we can forget. Our whys are an
inner plea that tears at our hearts and even measures our
heart. Our act of courage today is not to look at the past
but to allow the past to challenge us to look at our own
world,to hope for a future, something we so desperately
want not to do.
But these stories are not the only ones to tell. In fact,
as important as they are to tell, they may be the least important to tell. A visit to the horrors of the Holocaust shockingly confronts us with other tales, tales of courage, of
dogged humaneness, of people risking themselves, often
on the spur of the moment without even an acquaintance
with those being helped. Eliezer Berkovitz has said that
this hell on earth became the place where both the depths
of human depravity and the heights of human nobility are
revealed. He is right. Auschwitz is the answer to our
despair because we are finally not left alone with the horrors. We are restored by the courage of those who would
not give in, would not be defeated. We are able to find by
confronting the whole story that our hearts are-our heart
is-restored. And again we are amazed into silence, except
that we know that these stories must be told, all of them in
order to sense the full range of despair and hope. We
need this, our generation so burdened with the frightful
face of our world. We need more than the mundane of life
that allows a failed escape, that only repeats the naivete of
our past. We need the U.S. Holocaust Memorial as a sign
of our American heart, a challenge to find our collective
courage. 0
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murder of two million Armenians and
thus allowed the Nazi murder of six
million Jews. The sick among us now,
whether they are the dupes of a
Klansman like David Duke or the followers of a black racist like the Nation
of Islam's Khalid Abdul Muhammad,
try to deny the fact of the Holocaust.
In paranoid frenzy such anti-Semites
maintain that the story of the
Holocaust is a plot by Zionists to camouflage Jewish sins, curry undeserved
favor in the court of world opinion
and thereby enhance the power of
Jews across the globe. We might wish
to dismiss such vicious nonsense as
the propagandist ramblings of a
insignificant fringe. But we dare not.
Neo-Nazism is on the rise in Germany.
And
surveys among today's American
Fredrick Barton
schoolchildren indicate a frightfully
widespread ignorance about Hitler's
policy of murder.
In a world which must forever
In d efia nt pr e p a ra tion for his
campaign to murder all the world's muster the will to stand against it, the
J ews, Adolph Hitler sa id, "After all , memory of evil is crucial. Already it
seems we are steeling ourselves to forwho remembers today the Turks'
extermination of the Armenians?" As get current events in Bosnia. But
there as elsewhere, evil exists. Men
d estruction of th e infamous Podgorze
gh e tto in Kr a kow b egins in Steven have believed and continue to conSpielberg's devastating Schindler's List, vince themselves that genocide is justia Nazi commander sneers at the half- fied. That's why Schindler's List is so
important; it is history for the masses.
millenium of prosperity Jews have
enjoyed in Poland by saying, "After It makes immediate and tangible that
today, it never happen ed." The world which has so soon grown distant and
in some minds debatable. Schindler 's
didn 't learn the lesson of the Turkish
List isn'tjust the film of the year. It's a
film
for the ages.
Fredrick Barton is Prof essor of English and
Based on the non-fiction novel by
Associate Dean of Liberal Arts at the University
Thomas Keneally and adapted for the
of New Orleans. He is film editor and columnist
screen by Steven Zaillian, Schindler's
for the newsweekly Gambit and author of the
List is the true story of a handful of
novels Th e El Cholo Fe eling Passes,
Courting Pandemonium, and the current Jews who miraculously survived the
Holocaust and of one strange and
With Extreme Prejudice ( Villard/ Random
complicated German man from the
H ouse) which was recently purchased for reading
Sudetenland
of Czechoslovakia who
by President Bill Clinton. Professor Barton's
defied the policies of an entire nation
1993 contributions to The Cresset were "Praise
in the midst of a homicidal rampage.
and Blame" in April an d "Family Films" in

A Hiding Place in Hell

Oskar Schindler (Liam Neeson)
arrives in Krakow shortly after the
Nazi victory in the fall of 1939. An
inveterate gambler and shameless flatterer, Schindler has already joined the
Nazi party in hopes of boosting his
business connections . In Krakow ,
Schindler converts his meager
resources into a fine suit of clothes, a
gold Nazi pin and a small wad of cash.
Then, armed mostly with audacity, he
sets out to hustle himself an
entrepreneurial career. By night he
frequents the city's nightclubs, buying
drinks and otherwise befriending Nazi
officers. By day he leverages investments from Jews who are alread y
being packed into the sixteen square
blocks of Podgorze. Soon he's in position to bid for rights to a dormant
enamelware factory and to exploit his
Nazi connections for lucrative contracts as a military supplier. Schindler
turns management of his company
over to a savvy Jewish accountant
named Itzhak Stern (Ben Kingsley)
and, employing unpaidJewish workers
for whom he's charged only a user fee
by the S.S., Schindler quickly begins to
amass a fortune.
The Oskar Schindler we meet in
the film's opening passages is hardly
admirable. He's unprincipled and selfabsorbed. He's a hard drinker and a
shameless womanizer. He cares for
nothing, it seems, save the pursuit of
pleasure and his own chance for riches. He seems to suffer no pangs of
guilt, for instance, when he tak e s
occupation of a luxurious home from
which aJewish family has been brutally evicted. Even at this stage, however,
Schindler is different from the Nazi
officers he spends so much time
courting. There's no malice in him.
He's more than a bit blind to the
inherent evil of the Nazis, but he
doesn't suffer from th eir racist dis-
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ease. He drives a hard bargain with
those Jews he recruits as investors, but
he still treats them as men. He
forthrightly takes advantage of their
desperate circumstances, but he
doesn't degrade them. This lack of
racism is the crack in Schindler's selfishness which Stern exploits to turn a
Polish enamelware factory and its
Czechoslovakian armaments successor
into shelters where nearly 1,200 souls
manage to ride out the Holocaust's
bloody storm.
Spielberg pointedly contrasts
Schindler's character with that of
Amon Goeth (Ralph Fiennes), commandant of the slave camp at Plaszow.
Goeth is a psychopath whose tortured
intellect would be laughable if the
man weren't so deadly. Goeth shares
with Schindler a love of pretty women,
rich food and fine liquor. He's ami-

able enough a dinner and drinking
companion that Schindler fails to see
his true nature for far too long.
Goeth's devotion to the Nazi gospel is
so devout that he tells a pretty Jewish
girl to whom he's paid a compliment,
"Of course, I realize you're not a person, in the strictest sense of the word."
Goeth is possessed of such polite
social niceties as to warn his Jewish
housekeeper not to stand too close
because he doesn't want to give her
his cold. But then in another moment
he can murder the innocent with the
same yawning detachment he might
employ in the swatting of an insect.
Goeth is like the lynch mob leader
McLendon in William Faulkner's "Dry
September" who rallies his townspeople to murder with the cry "Are you
going to let the black sons get away
with it until one really does it?" Goeth

is annoyed when a pretty female
Jewish engineer informs him of construction flaws in the building of the
slave camp and has her shot for impudence. Then with a shrug immediately
thereafter, he orders that the dead
engineer's design corrections be instituted. Once the Plaszow camp is completed Goeth often strolls out on his
balcony after breakfast, and in a routine as reflexive as that of stretching
and scratching himself, randomly
shoots Jewish laborers for committing
the sin of falling into his gun sights at
a moment when his trigger finger itches. Among the horrors this film makes
commonplace is the way in which the
Jews at Plaszow gradually become
hardened to Goeth's morning rifle fire
as an unavoidable condition of the
dawning day.
When Schindler witnesses the liq-

German Industrialist Oska-r Schindle-r (Limn Neeson) welcomPs his wo-rke-rs to the safety of his nnv factory' at Brinnlitz.
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uidation of Podgorze, his attitude
toward the Nazis changes, almost, it
seems, against his own wishes.
Schindler loves the luxury that his
money has provided him. He cares little for either the product or the management of his factory and initially
suffers only embarrassment when his
Jewish workers try to .thank him for saving their lives. Schindler's evolution is
gradual. Early on he feels great
warmth only toward Ste~n (who is
understandably slow to return it), but
with time he comes to feel connected
to many of the people who work for
him. Once he realizes that the Nazis
aren't planning just to discriminate
againstJews but actually kill them all,
he strives to frustrate their plans, first
by arranging employment for as many
Jews as possible, far more than he
actually needs to run his factories,
finally exhausting his fortune in bribing Gaeth for the opportunity to provide sanctuary at an armaments plant
in Czechoslovakia for a list of 1,200
people.
The space available to me here is
not adequate for detailing all the
praise I feel this film deserves. Acclaim
is due to author Keneally who assembled the individual stories which give
a human face to an atrocity almost
beyond comprehension. Director
Spielberg's decision to override the
wishes of Universal Studio executives
and strive for a documentary look to
Schindler's List gives his picture a feel of
history
captured in progress.
Cinematographer Janusz Kaminski's
icy black and white images appropriately suggest the lowest reaches of
hell. Steven Zaillian's screenplay shows
us the good that can be done even by
unheroic men when they respond to
the dicta.tes of conscience. Liam
Neeson's lead performance never
frames Schindler with an icon's halo,
but always keeps a fundamental ambiguity at the center of his character.
And Ben Kingsley's work as Stern
underscores the critical extent to
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which Jews were vitally involved in
their own survival.
One hopes that Schindler's List
finally silences those petty naysayers
who have derided Steven Spielberg
despite such masterworks as E. T. and
Empire of the Sun. From the religious
candle at the opening which burns out
and dissolves into the smoke of the
Nazi ovens, to the director himself
standing vigil by Schindler's grave at
the end, this is haunting filmmaking.
The light of world Judaism flickered in
the winds of Nazi bigotry. But it did
not go out. Oskar Schindler is one of
the people who shielded the flame
from the ovens' snuff.
Steven
Spielberg keeps it alive today through
the artistry of his filmmaking craft.
In the nascent years of the film
medium, D.W. Griffith realized the
special power of cinema to communicate with the masses. Woodrow Wilson
called Griffith's classic The Birth of a
Nation "history written in lightning."
But Griffith's epic tale of the Civil War
and Reconstruction is anything but
history. Even today it remains a dazzling instance of filmmaking, but it's
also an egregious exercise in bigotry
which makes heroes of Ku Klux Klan
nightriders and villains of the freed
slaves. By the time Hitler was launching his blitzkrieg across the plains of
Europe he had a skilled filmmaker in
his
diabolical
service.
Leni
Riefenstahl's Triumph of the Will makes
Nazism look self-sacrificing, glamorous and thrilling.
In the pages of this publication
and elsewhere I have confessed my
concern about the power of cinema to
misinform, misconstrue and mislead.
A work like Oliver Stone's execrable
JFK takes deliberate liberties with fact
in order to promote a paranoid thesis.
And yet for thousands, maybe millions,
Stone's conspiracy theories aboutJohn
Kennedy's assassination become the
popular understanding of fact. That's
why I was so hard on Alan Parker's
mostly well-meaning Mississippi

Burning. In service to his story about
the 1964 murders of three civil-rights
workers, Parker makes heroes of the
FBI and passive victims of the movie's
black characters. Since J. Edgar
Hoover's FBI was anything but an
agent of social change, and since the
legacy of the civil-rights movement was
one of activism and profound courage,
I complained loudly at the release of
Mississippi Burning in 1989 that Parker
was forging a popular history that was
diametrically wrong.
Historical purists might fault
Spielberg on these grounds, I suppose. Keneally has complained publicly about a fictional development
near the end of Schindler's List. As the
war in Europe is about to end,
Schindler gathers his Jewish employees
about him and informs that soon they
will be free. His own fate, he explains,
will be more problematical. He is a
member of the Nazi party, after all,
and he has run war industries utilizing
slave labor. As the Jews prepare for liberty, Schindler must go into hiding.
Then at the time of his departure, he
breaks down, lamenting that he has
saved even a farthing for himself,
because with a fine suit of clothes or a
gold pin or a luxury automobile, additional lives might have been snatched
from the gas chambers. In fact,
Schindler made no such speech,
engaged in no public second guessing
of himself whatsoever, and hurried
away into the night in a car laden with
jewels. Spielberg has explained that at
the end of his picture Schindler speaks
for all of surviving humanity and that
the variance with fact is in that way
defensible. I shall not bother to
engage the director on this point save
to credit him with elsewhere having
fully established the complexities of
Oskar Schindler's odd journey to heroism. I should note, however, that in
emotional terms the closing twenty
minutes of Schindler's List do not
require Schindler's fictionalized
speech to develop the greatest impact

The Cresset

I have ever encountered at a motion
picture.
In most every other regard
Spielberg has indeed written history
in lightning. There are a score or
more of unforgettable scenes. Among
them in the early going is the casual
torment of a Jewish student who is
cornered by storm trooper thugs on a
Krakow street. The Jew hasn't done
anything. He represents no threat. He
is harassed and humiliated because he
can be, because the society in which
he finds himself has silenced all voices
who might speak out for fundamental
human decency. This is a society which
has encouraged hate to the extent
that we see a pretty eight-year-old
blond German girl with her face
screwed up into a venomous mask,
cursing and spitting at distraught
Jewish families being herded from
their homes with only such possessions
as they can carry into the holding pen
at Podgorze. In a series of scenes we
witness the mad illogic of the Nazi
mind. Stern has long been recognized
for his superb organizational abilities,
by Schindler, of course, but by Goeth
and other Nazis as well. So as the "final
solution" is being prepared, Stern is
placed in charge of the mobilization.
He's to maintain proper records ,
arrange the rail transportation and
relocate every Jew in Poland to a death
camp. Stern is invaluable, but he 's a
Jew. And so he must reserve a place

March 1994

on the last train to Auschwitz for himself.
A repeated motif in Schindler's
List is the stubborn hope of the incarcerated Jews which manifests itself in
sad self-delusion. Surely the Nazis
won't do anything other than steal
their homes and crowd them into a
ghetto. Surely the Nazis have done
their worst by establishing slave camps
like that at Plaszow. Surely the Nazis
wouldn't undermine their own war
effort by squandering the advantage
of free Jewish labor. Surely the rumors
about gas chambers aren't true. The
incarcerated Jews deceive themselves
in part because the alternative is
despair. But we must rid ourselves of
such deceptions today. We must look
the truth in its sometimes ugly face.
Racism possesses the power to turn
men into monsters. Racism stands ever
ready to alchemize atrocity into justice.
Late in the film the women at
Plaszow try to prepare themselves for
the latest purge which will send many
in their midst to the gas chambers.
New Jewish slaves are arriving from
Yugoslavia and space must be created.
Goeth orders that the sick, aged and
weak shall be culled out and sent to
the o vens at Auschwitz . Huddled
together in their dark, cramped barracks, the starving, panicked women
try to make themselves look healthy
and strong. They brush their hair and

bite their lips in hopes of adding
color. Finally, they prick their fingers
to rouge their cheeks, shed their own
blood in a desperate bid for life. In a
subsequent scene, holding their flimsy
clothes in a bundle before them,
naked Jews are run past a row of tables
where white-smocked Nazi "doctors"
sit "evaluating" their health. Playing
like a scene out of Caligula's Rome ,
the "doctors" arbitrarily direct these
runners into two separate lines. Those
in one line will live another day; those
in the other will be murdered Immediately.
In countless scenes like these ,
Spielberg depicts the Holocaust's
unspeakable horror. And yet Schindler's
List is finally a story about life, not
death, about hope, not despair. Its
end is a catharsis. For whatever murky
reasons arising from his opaque soul,
Schindler accomplished the impossible. Twelve hundred people survived
in his sanctuary. A half century later
the heirs of the Schindlerjuden exceed
6,000 in number while in all of contemporary Poland there are fewer
than 4,000 Jews. This is the history lesson of Schindler's List. the Holocaust
was; the Jews are. We must learn the
lesson of the Holocaust. We must
never forget the long nightmare of
Europe's Jews lest those who hate
should some day prevail. This is
Spielberg's triumph: viewers of
Schindler's List will remember. 0
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The Ice Machine is Frozen,
and Other Paradoxes of MidWinter
Arvid F. Sponberg

The Ice Machine Is Frozen
Martin Luther King Day comes
amid the Great Cold Snap of 1994, the
same day that Bobby Ray Inman withdraws from his nomination as
Secretary of Defense., and the university's men's basketball team posts an
unprecedented fourth victory in conference play. At the end of the day,
there is a lot to be thankful for.
In the morning, I hear the fine
address of Dr. Bernard Lafayette, a colleague of Dr. King's whose warm
inflections, phrases, and recollections
project the ideals of Dr. King into the
future. Afterwards, as I walk out of the
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chapel my shoulders involutarily
hunch around my ears. The cold
carves through my coat, trousers, long
underwear and begins to pare the skin
from my thighs.
On Monday night , Walt
Wangerin calls to ask if it is true that
classes have been canceled. Walt has
just driven home from Indianapolis
and he is a man who finds inspiration
on walks in the woods at night when it
is 20 below zero. He comes from
North Dakota and longs to live in
Alaska. Classes have indeed been canceled for only the second time in twenty-two years. As we talk, I check the
thermometer outside my kitchen window: 23 below. Walt remains skeptical.
Wednesday is just as cold as
Tuesday, but classes are back in session. At 11:50 I start a class. At 11:55
the lights go out. We wait in the gloom
for ten minutes. I know the lights
won't be back on for hours. I feel it. I
dismiss class. My students head out of
the building. I gather up books and
papers, shove them into my brief case,
and reassemble my arctic armor. As I
leave the building, the lights come on.
I head to the union for lunch. In
the cafeteria line, I hear one of the
cashiers say, 'There is no ice. The ice
machine is frozen."

Keeping Silent During the Execution
On Martin Luther King Day, I
attend a forum on the question,
Should English Be Made the Official
Language of the United States? I
remain puzzled why the proposal to
make English the official language
attracts any support. A nation of immigrants would be, you would think,
proudly multi-lingual. It would be
supremely skilled in the arts of translation. Its children would regard it as
"cool" to speak three or four languages
by the time they graduated from high
school. Apparently the yea rning to
leave the old world behind remains so
strong in some American hearts that it
can be assuaged only by legislation
that silences all other tongues. The
announced aim of such legislation is
unity and social solidarity. But there
are other kinds of unity.
The unity of an orchestra is of a
different kind. It requires the silence
of the leader so that each voice can
blend with the others and yet be distinctly heard . Dennis Friesen-Carper
conducts orchestras and choruses. In
conversation with him one day recently, the topic of trusting others rises for
consideration. Dennis says that the
trust of the conductor by the musicians must be extraordinary. He says
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that the trust depends not only on the
players' respect for the conductor's
musicianship, but also on their understanding of the conductor's concept of
how any particular work should sound.
During the perfor~ance of this concept the conductor remains silent.
Think of this: you have a clear
idea of how something should be
done-but the only way to produce
the desired result requires you to keep
silent during the execution.
Maybe speakers of English could
create social solidarity more effectively
by keeping silent from time to time
and listening for the harmonies of the
voices around them.

Making Space
The craft of acting is full of paradoxes. The stage whisper is an example. Another is "blocking" a play. This
does not mean stopping a play from
occurring. It means carefully arranging the movements· and positions of
actors so that the overall effect appears
unforced and natural. Often, depending upon the size of the cast and of the
stage, the more natural you want the
play to look, the more precise and
complicated the blocking may
become.
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Consider the fact that the en tire
art depends on memory of both blocking and words. The object is to have
done the the lines and movements so
many times that you can, at any and
every performance, create the illusion
that you are doing them for the first
time.
On January 21st, these and related thoughts entered and exited my
mind as I watched Philip Edward Van
Lear "work the room," which, in this
case, belonged to Julian Brown's class
in American Minority Theater. Mr.
Van Lear earns his living as a professional actor and director in Chicago.
Currently, he is assistant director on
"The African Company Presents
Richard III" which opened in late
February for a limited run at the
Illinois Theatre Centre in Park Forest.
There were about twelve of us in
Mr. Van Lear's aura for almost two
hours. He instructed us in many parts
of the actor's craft. Though he spoke,
he also moved. He used the entire area
available to him. He advanced upon us
and retreated. He strode-he swaggered-he skimmed-he swooped. He
extended himself into every cubic inch
of space, probing the contents of the
ether for the ineluctable strands of
confluence between his mind and
heart and ours. And in this movement,

this dance of instruction, he carried us
into the region of his art that remains
forever just out of reach of words.
To the actor it often seems as if
other artists have not an easier time,
exactly, but an advantage in being able
to go to their work with fewer encumbrances. The painter seems to go
directly to the canvas. The musician
seems to need only to touch the keyboard or raise the horn to her lips. But
an actor solitary in a studio is barely an
actor. In the theater there seems to be
so much more to arrange before the
work can begin. Just making the space
to do the work becomes an accomplishement.
Mr. Van Lear is a talented and
persevering actor and so he works frequently. But actors never know for certain when they will work again. And so
Mr. Van Lear "worked" on us. He
acted the part of an actor instructing a
class in the art of acting. For me it was
thrilling to witness the performance
and I hope it was not the last time that
we will see Mr. Van Lear on our
stages-excuse me-in our classrooms.
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Greatness
Arthur Ashe and Arnold Rampersand.
Days of Grace: A Memoir. New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1993.
Roughly half way through Arthur
Ashe's memoirs, Days of Grace, which
were composed in the last year of his
life and, indeed, bring us almost to the
moment of his death, we are offered a
chapter entitled "The Burden of
Race ." The issue of Ashe's race has
not been absent from the book until
now, but it has been muted and incidental to other concerns. Describing
the public response to his announcement of having contracted AIDS, he
writes, "race and politics crossing
medicine and disease. One card I
received called me "an inspiration to
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many people during your career. .. It
was signed: 'A white family in
Mississippi'" (30). Attempting to deal
with the onset of retirement from tennis, he draws on W.E.B. DuBois for wisdom. He refers to his friendship with
prominent African Americans like
Andrew Young, who married Ashe and
h is wife Jeanne, and David Dinkins.
The second chapter tantalizes with its
title, "Middle Passage." This could
well be a reference to the Middle
Passage of slave ships and the triangular trade between Europe, Africa, and
the Americas and hence to his identity
as an African American. But the chapter turns out to deal with passage to
middle life involving very different
kinds of questions about identity. The
fourth chapter takes up his involvement in protest and politics, and his
crusade against apartheid in South
Africa. The chosen cause tips the
hand and yet even here the issue of his
African American identity remains
more an undercurrent than a subject
of meditation . Then comes the fifth
chapter whose title I have already mentioned and its opening is absolutely
startling, especially when it comes
from a man who is very measured in
his comments and who has so carefully
avoided extremes and hyperbole.
He is being interviewed by a
reporter from People magazine about
how he is coping with AIDS. She asks,
"I guess this must be the heaviest burden you have ever had to bear, isn't
it?" Ashe responds, "No it isn't. It's a
burden all right ... but being black is
the greatest burden I have had to
bear" (126). How could this be? AIDS
will kill Ashe. On the other hand,
despite the burden of race, Ashe is
affluent, highy regarded, a national
celebrity, a man whose life is a triumph
by most standards by which we measure success. When the reporter has
trouble believing what Ashe has said,
Ashe elaborates: "My disease is the
result of biological factors over which
we, thus far, have had no control.

Racism, however, is entirely made by
people, and therefore it hurts and
inconveniences more" (126-27). He
speaks of the "pall of sadness" that
hangs over the lives of all African
Americans, whether they are
Wimbledon champions or welfare
recipients trapped in the inner city.
The sadness stems not only from what
the blacks have "experienced historically," but also from "what we as individuals experience each and every day"
( 127).
The Thirteenth Amendment, ratified in December, 1865, guaranteed
legal emancipation to all African
Americans in the United States. As we
know, emancipation did not bring
equality. Rules and principles of law
and justice do not always, or easily,
translate into experiential reality. One
hundred and twenty eight years after
emancipation and roughly three
decades after the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965, the transition from slavery to full
citizenship has yet to take place for
even the top level of African
Americans. That is, if full citizenship
is to be defined as equal opportunity
for self-development and freedom
from constraints and offenses of
racism, then for African Americanseven African Americans like Ashe, who
are integrated into the American
mainstream, have flourished economically and socially, and who have loved
America-America is yet to offer this
full citizenship, yet to love them back.
A cover story in the Newsweek of
November 15, 1993, focused on the
hidden anger of middle class blacks. A
recent book by Ellis Cose, also excerpted in the November 15 issue of
Newsweek, dwells more fully on the
same phenomenon. In The Rage of a
Privileged Class, Cose argues that professionally
successful
African
Americans, who share the prevailing
mores of the white middle class in
terms of belief in Jaw and order and in
the virtues of hard work, continue to
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feel angry because they continue to
suffer the pricks of racism, and that
these affronts to self-worth, slight
though they may seem, wound the very
souls of
middle class African
Americans. Many whites, even liberals,
may find this anger unjustified. In the
many debates I have heard on this
issue, the claims of progress made by
blacks always loom large.
These claims are undeniable
and, in most instances, accepted by
African Americans. Here is a summary
of the political gains made in recent
years that appears in a recent textbook
written by African Americans: "In
1992 nearly eight thousand of all elected officials in the United states were
blacks. The Congress of 1993 had thirty-nine Afro-American members, and
the first Cabinet of the Clinton administration contained four blacks. In
addition, thousands of Afro-Americans
have sat on city and county councils
and in state legislatures. Many blacks
have also served as mayors of the
nation's largest cities ... Blacks have
gained seats in state courts, including
several state supreme courts, and have
increasingly served in the federal judiciary. Remarkably, two blacks have
filled seats on the US. Supreme Court.
They have sat at the highest levels in
the federal executive departments"
(Africans in the Americas 277).
But the middle class blacks claim,
and rightly so, that despite these gains,
the national culture continues to be
racist. Cose offers numerous examples. He interviews executives who,
despite praise for their work and
despite all their intelligence and hard
work, find themselves blocked from
achieving top positions. Others find
themselves pigeonholed into what are
considered black jobs which are typically jobs in community service, public
affairs, or jobs which require working
with other blacks or minorities. Even
the most successful blacks find themselves unable to gain access to certain
residential areas or to exclusive private
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clubs. Cose records the seething
anger of a black lawyer, a partner in an
elite firm and "normally [a] restrained
and unfailingly gracious man" (56).
The lawyer tells of an incident of few
days earlier. He arrives early in his
office building and travels up the elevator with a young white man. When
they arrive at the office doors, the
senior lawyer finds his way barred by
the young man and can only enter
after barking out his name which identifies him as a senior partner. The
lawyer reflects: "After all, he had been
dressed much better than the associate. His clients paid the younger
man's salary. The only thing that
could have conceivably stirred the
associate's suspicions was race:
'Because of his color, he felt he had
the right to check me out'" (Cose 56).
These are not imagined slights of
people who carry chips on their shoulders, and I have evidence for this
much closer to home. After graduating from Jaw school, and despite the
fact that he was more qualified than
most, my African American husband
could only find his first job working
with a black lawyer in Gary. The much
debated affirmative action plans which
have supposedly made it so easy for
qualified African Americans to find
jobs function, for whatever they are
worth, in big firms and in big cities
and not in the predominantly white
suburban town in which we live. In
another job search, a would-be
employer told my husband quite candidly that he could only hire him after
ascertaining from his major clients
whether they would be willing to work
with an African American. In fact, this
employment had to be cleared with
the office secretary as well who was
known to be mildly racist and who had
worked for a long time in the office
and now was viewed as indispensable.
A young partner, a friend of my husband and far from being a bigot, once
made a demeaning remark about
blacks. When my husband pointed out

that he was black, the friend's
response, offered as a compliment, was
in fact even more galling: "Oh! I don't
see you as black."
How does one live with these
constant slights? How does one survive with dignity and self-confidence
intact? Many don't. "Even those who
refuse to internalize the expectation of
failure are often left with nagging
doubts, with a feeling, as journalist
Joseph Boyce puts it, 'that no matter
what you do in life, there are very few
venues in which you can really be sure
that you've exhausted your potential.
Your achievement is defined by your
color and its limitation' " (Cose 58).
Those who survive do so by employing
several strategies, chief among which is
the suppression of anger. My husband
did eventually work with the candid
boss who had to check with his clients
before offering a job. He has learned
to smile, to shrug his shoulders and to
carry on. He and others have no use
for whining but they have also learned
that self-control and self-suppression
are absolutely necessary to meet the
rather tough standards, much more
tough for blacks than for whites, by
which they are seen to fit in, to belong
to an institution, a corporation, a business.
While there are groups of
African Americans who overuse the
rhetoric of victimization and who
ascribe all failures to race, they in no
way represent the majority or find
favor among the educated blacks.
Thus, claims that the verdict against
Mike Tyson was inspired by racism or
that racism accounts for the unnecessary alacrity with which the press is
hounding Michael Jackson find little
support even among those middle
class and professional blacks who
speak of the permanence of racism in
our society and suffer the pricks of
racism in their daily lives. In his memoirs, Ashe discusses the prevalence of
conspiracy theories among African
Americans in connection with the
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spread and treatment of AIDS. He will
not subscribe to the theory that AIDS
was created in the laboratory for purposes of genocide. He takes up the
question of Kemron, the drug developed in Kenya for which great claims
have been advanced, and whose lack
of acceptance by the American medical establishment has been blamed on
racism. Ashe writes, "I myself don't
have to be convinced that Europeans
are skeptical about scientific claims by
Africans ... But I am not going to
ingest a drug simply to show support
for the notion that science can flourish
in Africa" (133). He wants proof and
when he does not find the proof, he
leaves Kemron alone.
Coming from Arthur Ashe, as
sane a man any we have had on the
public scene, his dissection of how
racism distorts the fabric of American
life, particularly the fabric of the life of
African Americans, carries special
weight and credibility. He says that he
is "almost always aware of race, alert to
its power as an idea, sensitive to its
nuances in the world. Like many other
blacks, when I find myself in a new
public situation, I will count ... the
number of black and brown faces present, especially to see how many, if
any, are employed by the hosts" (131).
He wonders if he is hypersensitive but
recognizes that even this hypersensitivity is a distortion caused by the effect
of racism. He is attending a benefit
match for the Arthur Ashe Foundation
for the defeat of AIDS with his family
and sitting in the box with him are
Stan Smith and his family. Smith's
daughter has brought along twin
blond dolls, and pre sen ted one to
Camera, Ashe's daughter. Suddenly
Ashe freezes at the · thought that the
cameras will show Camera playing with
a blond doll and thus invite criticism
from the black community. He
arranges for the doll to be taken away
and then regrets the action as a violence against the innocence of his
child. He concludes that racism has so
sullied the fabric of our lives that now
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hypocrisy and defensiveness are our
instinctive responses ( 130).
However successful, however selfconfident, Ashe feels that he will
always remain marked by the shadow
of race, a shadow so uneradicable that
"only death will free me, and blacks
like me, from its pall" (128). Ashe
speaks of other ways that the shadow
of race has affected his behavior, his
very character and in his description
we recognize the strategies of survival I
have mentioned earlier. He says that
he became " a master at the game that
all African Americans must learn if
they wish to preserve their sanity," if
they wish to live with some dignity. "I
learned not so much to turn the other
cheek as to present ... no cheek at all.
I learned to give no opportunity for a
bigot to pounce on and exploit. I
learned in moments of humiliation to
walk away with what was left of my dignity, rather than to lose it all in an
explosion of rage" (138).
As Ashe analyzes his character
and considers his strengths and weaknesses, he also dissects the various
forces which have shaped him. He
knows that he is considered cool and
even cold. The byline on a cover story
on him in Life reads, "The Icy
Elegance of Arthur Ashe" (50). He
admits that he can be detached and
certainly he is a rationalist who carefully analyzes the situation. During his
captaincy of the Davis Cup team, he is
blamed by some of his players for not
been sufficiently involved in the game.
McEnroe, for instance, "complained
about Ashe's demeanor, which he
found too placid" (80). While Ashe is
proud of his record as captain of the
Davis Cup team, he admits that he
would have been more effective if he
had been more aggressive and if he
had imposed his will on the volatile
McEnroe or the irascible Connors
(99). Partly Ashe's "placid" behavior is
rooted in his more "correct" standards
of behavior which will not allow him to
accept the bad temper of these players
on the court or their use of foul Ian-

guage. In tennis, Ashe seems to
belong almost to a different generation than players like McEnroe and
Connors, although the age difference
is not significant. Certainly, he was
viewed by others and by himself as
being old-fashioned. Ashe was always
the perfect gentleman on court, the
player with exceptional grace and
courtesy. But the placid behavior has
other roots as well. He speculates, for
instance, that part of his reticence of
behavior may have to do with
repressed feelings resulting from the
early death of his mother (50).
However, more than anything
else, this self-control, this absolutely
correct behavior is a very deliberately
cultivated grace. It is a grace born of
enormous self-discipline which is
required of African Americans if they
are to succeed in the white world, certainly the white-dominated world of
tennis. He has been taught by his
black mentors to be "unfailingly polite
on the court, unfalteringly calm and
detached, so that whites could never
accuse me of meanness" (110). This
wariness born of the burden of race
becomes with Ashe a gift of grace. It
shapes his conduct in all arenas of his
life. It spurs him to find higher sanctions for his life than those available to
a professional athlete. He seeks that
benediction in life which comes from
high seriousness and moral purpose.
On retiring from the life of professional tennis he desires a life of commitment to humanity: "I wanted to make a
difference, however small, in the
world, and I wanted to do so in a useful and honorable way" (43). Since he
cannot dedicate his talents to simply
making money, his early retirement
becomes an opportunity to accomplish
something worthy. He wishes to teach
at a college, and will do so later choosing a historically black college as
against offers from an Ivy League.
Ashe's anti-apartheid crusade is , in
some measure as he himself recognizes, an attempt to make up for his
relative inaction during the civil rights
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struggle (112). In most instances, race
defines the causes he chooses. And in
each instance, for Ashe the politics of
protest must have a high moral purpose.
The black underclasses are on
fire in the inner cities. Black on black
violence is destroying a generation of
youth. Black leadership has not been
particularly effective in dealing with
black issues. There is, of course, Jesse
Jackson, whom Ashe characterizes as a
man who likes the limelight too much
and set out to become "the Minister
Plenipotentiary from black America to
the world" (159). Like Ashe, most of
the black middle class still admires
him but questions his capacity to be an
effective leader. In Ashe's memoirs we
hear the voice of a considerable section of the black middle class. Fully
aware of the manner in which this
nation's racism has contributed to the
simmering violence of the black
underclass, they nevertheless want to
eschew the rhetoric of blame of the
enemy for the rhetoric of responsibility.
Ashe's stance is perhaps a little
more conservative than is typical of
this group although not as conservative as that of Clarence Thomas or of
the columnist Thomas Sowells, who
are emblems of black voices most
acceptable to the establishment, and
who, as Sowells has, become darlings
of the media and annointed pundits
on issues of race. I am sure Thomas
would have also achieved this status
but for being tainted by sexual harrassment charges. Unlike these others,
Ashe's fundamental insights are
shared by most African Americans,
especially among the middle class. He
decries the irrationality fostered by
leaders like Sharpton and by a certain
class of black media like the radio station \\'LIB of New York, although even
here he remains sympathetic to the
points of view of many callers, sensing
"the hurt and sorrow behind the wild
accusations" (158). For Ashe, favors
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and rewards must be earned. He does
not believe that they are owed.
Mrican Americans need help to reach
the point where they can begin to benefit from education, but they too must
put in the effort.
Ashe's stance on affirmative
action is modulated by self-pride, by
his conviction that with equal opportunity blacks can achieve as much as
members of any other race, and by his
acute awareness that affirmative action
brings suspicions about blacks who are
now hired. Well-qualified blacks,
when hired under affirmative action
plans, find themselves being looked
down upon as not fully qualified for
the job. "What I and others want,
writes Ashe, "is an equal chance, under
one set of rules, as on a tennis court"
(153). He knows, however, that even
when equal opportunity is promised, it
is not always available, and hence there
is justification for adjustments like
affirmative action. "To be sure, while
rules are different for different people,
devices like affirmative action are ...
probably necessary" (153).
Ashe's lament on the breakdown
of family values, on the lack of morality among the young, identifies him at
one moment with Dan Quayle (160).
But now that Bill Clinton has also
acknowledged the merit of Quayle's
criticism in this one instance, we can
see the possibility of separating progressive politics from the language of
social determinism to which it had
become wedded, a language which
focused exclusively on victimization
and hence tended to absolve the individual of responsibility. In the context
of African American lives, Ashe is
sending a message we have not heard
for a while: Even as Mrican Americans
battle the racism so deeply embedded
in American culture, so often institutionalized in the structures of
American society, they must also help
themselves through means that seem
to have become discredited after the
civil rights era-education, electoral

politics, moral authority. This was
Ashe's belief. His life as he lived it and
as it is rendered in Days of Grace is a
beacon in that direction.
RenuJuneja
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